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The objective of this dissertation is to examine the ways in which households
recover from and adapt to changing conditions as a result of natural hazards. I use
Indonesia as a case study. The dissertation is divided into four chapters. In the first
chapter, I give an overview on the policy relevance of studying natural disasters as
well as the broad literature on the topic.
In the second chapter, I estimate the short- and medium-run economic re-
turns to capital and inherent ability by studying the recovery of fishermen in Aceh
from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Since the natural disaster wiped out a sig-
nificant portion of productive physical capital among fishermen, the subsequent
quasi-random infusion of aid boats generates a natural experiment. Using panel
data from fishing households, I investigate whether fishermen who were relatively
more productive pre-tsunami retain their productive edge ex-post. Results suggest
that (i) returns to inherent ability, measured by pre-tsunami productivity, become
more important over time while returns to physical capital, measured by aid boats,
become less important in the medium run, and (ii) the redistributive effects of boat
aid on productivity are small and temporary.
In the third chapter, I explore the short-run (one year) behavioral changes in
terms of market labor, voluntary labor, as well as borrowing through formal and in-
formal sources among Indonesian households in the aftermath of natural hazards. I
estimate the predicted number of hazards, including earthquakes, floods, landslides
and storms, in each of the sampled districts in each survey year using historical
data from 1980 to 2008. I then match household data with the residuals from these
regressions as the unexpected number of hazards. I find that women from districts
with more unexpected disasters work fewer weeks on the market. Unexpected dis-
asters are also associated with higher probabilities of borrowing and larger loans.
These results suggest that the substitution effect dominates the income effect in the
short run.
In the fourth chapter, I and co-author, Philip H. Brown, investigate the link
between poverty and vulnerability with respect to natural disasters by applying a
utility measure of vulnerability to household panel data from Indonesia that brackets
the 1997 forest fires. Using the decomposition method pioneered by Ligon and
Schechter (2003), we find that households who live in areas unaffected by smoke
from the fires were less vulnerable in total consumption, but they were no less
vulnerable or likely to face poverty, aggregate risk, or idiosyncratic risk in food
consumption than those who live in areas that were affected.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Humans face increasing exposure and vulnerability to natural hazards. Since
1970, there have been 3.3 million deaths due to these events, of which 95% of
deaths occurred in developing countries. In addition to lives lost, disaster-related
property damage equals 0.23% of total world output from 1970 to 2008 (World
Bank 2011). Not only are natural hazards happening more frequently over time, in
part due to climate change, but population growth and settlement in hazard-prone
areas, including coastal cities and floodplains, also contribute to the rising risks from
disasters.
The extensive macroeconomic literature on natural disasters focuses on the
short- and long-run mean responses of annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth
in every year of and after the exposure to natural hazards (see e.g. Fomby, Ikeda, and
Loyaza, 2011; Loayza et al. 2012; Raddatz 2009). These studies have two common
findings. First, different types of disasters have differential impacts on growth.
Storms, droughts, and earthquakes are found to negatively affect GDP, while floods
have a positive impact due to growth in the agricultural sector. Second, the level of
economic development influences the growth impact of disasters. Growth responses
from developing countries are always stronger, regardless of direction, than those
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from developed countries.
In contrast, the existing microeconomic literature on natural disasters is less
extensive and explores a variety of outcomes. One body of work examines the short-
and long-run health impacts of disasters. Maccini and Yang (2009), for instance,
link adult health, education, and socioeconomic outcomes with early-life exposure
to rainfall shocks in Indonesia. Aguilar and Vicarelli (2011), meanwhile, examine
the impacts of ENSO events on children’s health and cognitive outcomes in Mexico.
Insurance, better construction and maintenance practices, public information
about floodplains and fault lines, as well as early warning systems are examples of
strategies that mitigate and reduce disaster risks. However, risks cannot be com-
pletely insured or prevented by public policy. Therefore, it is important to under-
stand how people share and cope with residual risks. From an economic perspective,
it is also helpful to analyze the welfare implications of these coping mechanisms.
A substantial number of microeconomic studies explore the ways in which
households, especially those in rural areas, self-insure against negative income shocks
in the absence of formal insurance and credit markets. Examples of self-insurance
mechanisms include savings (Paxon 1992), livestock accumulation and liquidation
(Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas 1998), as well as migration and remittances (Halliday
2006). Several papers specifically investigate informal insurance networks as a form
of risk sharing among affected and unaffected households at the village or community
level via state-contingent transfers (see e.g. Zylberberg 2010; Czura and Klonner
2012).
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The goal of this dissertation is to examine the microeconomic impacts of nat-
ural hazards and examine the ways in which households adjust their behavior to
recover from and adapt to changing conditions as a result of unanticipated income
shocks. I use Indonesia as a case study because of its frequent exposure to natural
hazards, as well as the plausibly-exogenous variation in the exposure to hazards
across geographic areas within the country.
In the second chapter, I examine the short- and medium-run economic returns
to capital and inherent ability by studying the recovery of fishermen in Aceh from the
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Since the natural disaster wiped out a significant por-
tion of productive physical capital among fishermen, the subsequent quasi-random
infusion of aid boats generates a natural experiment. Using four waves of panel data
from fishermen, I investigate whether fishermen who were relatively more produc-
tive pre-tsunami retain their productive edge ex-post, controlling for the receipt and
quality of boat aid.
Focusing on the sample of fishermen who lost their pre-tsunami boats, I find
that the impact of aid boat length, as a measure of boat quality, on fishing revenue is
positive but diminishes over time. In contrast, I find that the impact of pre-tsunami
productivity on fishing revenue increases. These results suggest that returns to
inherent ability, measured by pre-tsunami productivity, become more important
over time while returns to physical capital, measured by aid boats, become less
important in the medium run.
In the third chapter, I explore the ways in which Indonesian households cope
with natural hazards in the short run (one year) through ex-post adjustments in
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market labor, voluntary labor, as well as borrowing through formal and informal
sources. These natural hazards include earthquakes, floods, landslides, storms and
surges. In addition, I examine gender differences in the changes of these outcomes.
To identify the causal impacts of these extreme weather events on household labor
and borrowing, I first estimate the predicted number of hazards in each of the 216
districts in each survey year using historical data from 1980 to 2008. I then match
household data with the residuals from these regressions as the unexpected number
of hazards.
I find that women from districts with more unexpected disasters work fewer
weeks on the market. I find no evidence of disaster-related changes in the male
labor supply. Unexpected disasters are also associated with higher probabilities of
borrowing and participation in rotating community credit groups, as well as larger
loans. These results suggest that in the context of Indonesia, the substitution effect
dominates the income effect in the short run.
In the fourth chapter, I investigate the link between poverty and vulnerability
with respect to natural disasters by applying a utility measure of vulnerability to
panel data that brackets a major forest fire. This chapter is a paper that I co-author
with Philip H. Brown, titled “Natural Disasters and Vulnerability: Evidence from
the 1997 Forest Fires in Indonesia,” which appears in Volume 11, Issue 1 of the B.E.
Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy in October, 2011. We estimate and analyze
household vulnerability in both total consumption and food consumption. We find
that households with a high degree of exposure to smoke from the fires were more
vulnerable in total consumption but no more vulnerable in food consumption.
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Chapter 2: Returns to Capital and Ability:
A Natural Experiment in Aceh
2.1 Introduction
There is a growing interest among economists in estimating returns to capital
in small-scale productive activities in developing countries (see Banerjee and Duflo
2005, for a review). The empirical strategy relies on exogenous variation in capital,
which is usually attained through randomized control trials in which additions in
capital are generated at random. These studies find positive effects of capital shock
on firm-level growth, suggesting that firms were credit-constrained. However, credit
constraint is not the sole determinant of firm-level growth as there is evidence of
heterogeneous returns to capital among firms. Udry and Anagol (2006), for exam-
ple, find heterogeneous returns by crop type in a sample of small-scale agricultural
producers in Ghana.1 de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) also find significantly
larger treatment impacts for Sri Lankan enterprises owned by males and no positive
return in enterprises owned by females. In addition, Fafchamps et al. (2014) find
heterogeneous effects between cash and in-kind treatments among microenterprises
1Among farmers growing traditional crops, the returns are found to be 50% per year. Among
those producing pineapples on plots of similar sizes, the returns are 250% per year.
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in Ghana. While the impact of cash is lower in male-owned businesses, only in-kind
grants cause growth among those that are female-owned. This result contrasts with
predictions of the Ramsey model of investment in which profit-maximizing firms
grow after removing credit constraints regardless of the form of credit provided.
The existing literature suggest various explanations for the differential levels of
and returns to capital investments. Fafchamps et al. (2014), for example, suggest the
lack of self-control as a plausible explanation for the ”flypaper” effect. Comparing
the relative performance of individual Norwegian sealing vessels between seasons,
Salvanes and Steen (1994) show that ”fishing luck” or a stochastic element is an
important determinant of fishing performance in terms of efficiency scores based on
a revenue model. Among producers in the garment industry in India, Banerjee and
Munshi (2004) argue that given differential productivity levels, differences in the
strength and type of social ties among two social groups lead to differences in access
to capital that in turn explain the different levels of investments between them.
Alternatively, Dodlova (2015) show that risk, in addition to credit constraint, is a
determinant of returns to capital among Peruvian microenterprises.
This chapter aims to contribute to the above literature by using micro-level
data to examine the economic returns to capital in the short- and medium-run using
a natural experiment in Indonesia. Specifically, I study the recovery of fishermen
in Aceh from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. I also investigate how the changes
in returns to capital compare with the changes in the returns to inherent fisherman
ability. Since the natural disaster wiped out a significant portion of productive
capital among fishermen, the subsequent quasi-random distribution of aid boats
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generates a natural experiment. Using panel data from fishing households who are
surveyed six months after the tsunami, and subsequently in 2007, 2009, and 2012,2
I investigate whether fishermen who were relatively more productive pre-tsunami
retain their productive edge ex-post, controlling for the receipt and quality of boat
aid.
This research question relates to studies that explore the possibility of catch-
ing up among units with low initial levels of productivity. Janes (2013), for ex-
ample, uses experimental evidence from Sri Lanka to examine whether one-time
capital grants enable microenterprises to reach the productivity levels of small- and
medium- sized enterprises (SMEs). The study finds that capital grants lead to gains
in productivity only among firms with owners who have higher cognitive ability and
are more risk averse. In addition, these gains are sufficient to generate convergence
in productivity between microenterprises and SMEs, but not with large businesses.
In this chapter, I similarly examine whether boat aid generates productivity gains
that are sufficient for fishermen with low levels of productivity pre-tsunami to catch
up with fishermen who were more productive.
More generally, this study contributes to the literature that examine the short-
and long-term adjustments to environmental hazards. From a macroeconomic per-
spective, Hornbeck (2012) finds that after the American Dust Bowl in the 1930s that
led to permanent soil erosion in many counties on the American plains, agricultural
adjustments, including land-use adjustments, recovered less than 25% of the initial
2I gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation (SES 0416840) and
the National Institute of Health (R01 HD057188) on a project managed by J. Vernon Henderson.
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agricultural costs. The main form of economic adjustment is population declines
in the more-eroded counties. From a microeconomic perspective, Manabu (2013)
uses the same context in Indonesia as this chapter to characterize the post-tsunami
occupational choice among fishermen. Using the total catch in 2007 as a measure
of average fishing productivity, the author finds that the combination of low quality
boat aid and the expansion of alternative sectors drove many pre-tsunami fisher-
men to choose non-fishing jobs, resulting in a smaller and less productive fishing
sector. Instead of examining the fishing sector as a whole, I focus on the economic
performance of individual fishermen who stay fishing post-tsunami, controlling for
the quality of boat aid.
Aid boats provided by donors are on average seven meters long, with a market
resale price of 15,500,000 Rupiah (about USD$1,550).3 Thus, the per-meter value
of a boat is approximately 2,214,286 Rupiah or USD$221. Given the median weekly
income for fishing households is 375,000 Rupiah (about USD$38), these aid boats
represent not only productive capital but also asset due to its nontrivial market
value (Nose 2014). In terms of quality, anecdotal evidence suggests that aid boats are
inadequate in terms of material (unseasoned wood or plastic), design (too lightweight
to withstand waves in the Indian Ocean), and durability due to the lack of equipment
and experience of boat builders (Thorburn 2009). In terms of assignment, the supply
of boats at the village level is based on the adoption decisions of NGOs (Henderson
and Lee 2014). Overall, Masyrafah and McKeon (2008) conclude that the allocation
3The annual exchange rate in 2005 is 9,852.62 Rp/$1USD; the exchange rate in 2007 is 9392.17
Rp/$1USD; the 2009 exchange rate is 9527.25 Rp/$1USD, and the 2012 exchange rate is 9631.27
Rp/$1USD.
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of aid from both local and international NGOs is inefficient due to the myriad of
objectives and targets. For example, some subdistricts (kecamatans) were adopted
by multiple donors, resulting in an excess supply of aid boats.
Focusing on fishermen who lost their pre-tsunami boats, I find that the transfer
of capital increases overall productivity, as the returns to aid boat length in terms of
fishing revenue are positive. However, I find that the returns to aid boat length di-
minish over time, suggesting that boat aid helps restore the pre-disaster equilibrium
but the redistributive effects on productivity are small and temporary. In contrast,
I find that returns to pre-tsunami productivity are positive and increase over time,
suggesting that fishermen who were relatively more productive pre-tsunami con-
tinue to be productive ex-post. My results suggest that returns to inherent ability,
measured by pre-tsunami productivity, are more important than returns to physical
capital in the long run.
This result is consistent with work done by de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff
(2008) showing heterogenous returns with respect to entrepreneurial ability but not
with measures of risk aversion or uncertainty among microenterprises in Sri Lanka.
More broadly, it contributes to a growing literature that suggests existing firm-level
conditions may lead to systematic differences in rates of return (e.g. Siba 2015,
McKenzie and Woodruff 2006, McKenzie and Woodruff 2008).4 Moreover, this result
nuances the finding in Bigsten et al. (2000), who show higher returns to physical
capital than human capital among small and medium scale manufacturing firms in
4McKenzie and Woodruff (2006, 2008) conduct experiments among small, urban micro enter-
prises in Mexico and find rates of return that range from 40% to 360% per year.
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Africa. Instead of comparing the returns to fishing ability and boats in absolute
terms, I show their relative importance as determinants of fishing performance over
time.
This result also contributes to the literature that studies the long-term eco-
nomic impact of aid in developing countries. The established empirical evidence
on this topic is mixed. Evaluating the impact of a large-scale, rural development
program in China that includes infrastructure investments, improved social services
and individual loans, Chen, Mu and Ravillion (2004) find that a decade after the
start of the program, the long-term average impact on income and consumption is
zero, despite evidence that short-term income gains are sizable and mostly saved. In
contrast, de Mel et al. (2012) find that one-time business grants to microenterprises
in Sri Lanka not only have short-term effects, but also non-zero impacts in the long
run. The authors find a 10 percentage point higher rate of survival among microen-
terprises five years after the grant, as well as higher monthly profits for male-owned
businesses. The result that a one-time infusion of capital has long-term economic
impact is suggestive of the existence of initial poverty traps or under-investment
due to productive nonconvexities. The infused capital may have enabled owners to
conduct lumpy investments with high returns that sustain over time.
Consistent with the finding in de Mel et al. (2012), I find that the impact of aid
boats on the economic performance of fishermen in Aceh is positive and non-zero in
2012, seven years after the tsunami hit. In addition, this chapter contributes to the
discussion by showing that the impact of one-time capital infusion is non-stationary
at different points in time, suggesting that the one-time grant of aid boats may
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have functioned as an emergency insurance for fishermen who lost their pre-tsunami
boats so that they can stay fishing before the credit markets are able to recover from
the aggregate shock.
By estimating the returns to physical capital that is distributed through an
aid program in post-tsunami Aceh, this study is also related to the literature that
evaluates the efficacy of in-kind transfers (see e.g. Currie and Gahvari 2008, Jacoby
1997). Controlling for the plausibly exogenous assignment of boat aid with respect
to pre-tsunami fishing productivity, I find that the receipt of aid boat increases the
probability of fishing post-tsunami. This result suggests that boat aid is useful in
sustaining household participation in fishing. However, I find that the effect of aid
boat length - a measure of productive capacity - on the probability of fishing is not
statistically different from zero. This result highlights the importance of boat aid
itself, regardless of its quality, on household participation in fishing.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes the data.
Section 2.3 presents the empirical strategy and robustness checks on the data. Sec-
tion 2.4 discusses the estimation results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Description
The data used in this chapter come from a large field study in Aceh, Indonesia,
that includes surveys at the village and fisherman head levels.5 The project covers
5The title of the project is “Population and Economic Recovery in Coastal Aceh: Aid and Village
Institutions” (principal investigator, J. Vernon Henderson, Brown University/National Bureau of
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the universe of fishing villages in two tsunami-affected kabupatens: Banda Aceh
and Aceh Besar.6 The universe of fishing villages is defined as having a significant
pre-tsunami fishing presence as certified by Panglima Laot, a fishermen community
organization in Aceh. The target population is fishing households living in these
coastal villages that were most heavily damaged by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.
Thus, the survey is not representative of the general population in Aceh (Nose 2014).
Rather, the sample of fishermen represents the average fisherman in the province.7
Figure 2.1 shows the geographic coverage of the project.
The baseline survey was conducted in June and July of 2005, covering 544 pre-
tsunami fishing households in 111 fishing villages. All of these villages around Banda
Aceh were hit by the tsunami. The survey represents 25% of all pre-tsunami boat
owners and 45% of surviving boat owners in these villages. The sampling frame was
drawn from a list of former fishing boat owners assembled by Panglima Laot, which
worked on rebuilding the fishing communities with disaster relief agencies. In each
village, fishing households were proportionally sampled from the list. Retrospective
information on pre-tsunami household characteristics, boat measures and fishing
activity was collected.
In terms of lives lost, less than 50% of the population survived (Freire, Hen-
derson and Kuncoro 2011). About 9% of houses and 6% of public buildings in the
Economic Research). This study is funded by the National Science Foundation (SES 0416840) and
the National Institute of Health (R01 HD057188).
6Provinces in Indonesia are divided into districts (kabupaten), which are further divided into
subdistricts (kecamatan).
7Nose (2014) compares and finds that the average household characteristics of fishermen in this
survey are similar to those of fishermen from the 2004 SUSENAS sample. The SUSENAS is a
series of large-scale multi-purpose socioeconomic surveys that covers a nationally representative
sample typically composed of 200,000 households.
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overall sample survived. In terms of productive capital for fishermen, the survival
rate of boats was under 6%. Although differentials in income levels exist among
fishing households pre-tsunami, the devastating impact of the tsunami leveled the
field for all fishing households.
The second round of the household survey was conducted in 2007, when the
original fishermen from the baseline survey had relocated away from refugee camps
to permanent homes. The 2007 survey recovers two-thirds of these original fisher-
men because some of them cannot be found. In addition, some of the fishermen from
the baseline survey are dropped from the 2007 and later surveys because their status
as pre-tsunami boat owners in the baseline was erroneous. I compare the averages
of pre-tsunami characteristics for each group and check whether the differences are
statistically significant. Table 2.16 in Appendix B reports these differences. Fish-
ermen who remained after the baseline are only different from those who attrited
in terms of having fewer household members and being more likely to have fathers
who were also fishermen (significant at the 1% and 5% levels). Thus, there is little
evidence from the data to suggest that the fishermen who attrited from the sample
after the baseline are systematically different from those who remain in the sample
post-tsunami.8
In addition, 443 new fishing households were added to the sample in 2007.
Many of these new fishing households became boat owners through the aid process
after the tsunami. The third and fourth rounds of the survey are conducted in 2009
8As a robustness check, I account for the presence and absence of fishing households in each
post-tsunami survey round using a probit model and inverse probability weights (Wooldridge 2007)
(see Section 2.3.4 below).
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and 2012, resurveying 353 and 330 of the original households covered in the base-
line survey.9 To examine whether more productive fishermen pre-tsunami retain
their productive edge among their peers ex-post, I restrict my estimation sample to
include only panel fishing households who have been present since the 2005 base-
line survey. This sample construction process results in an unbalanced panel of
1,590 observations and a balanced panel of 1,243 observations (approximately 350
households) over four survey years (2005, 2007, 2009 and 2012).
2.2.2 Summary Statistics
2.2.2.1 Household Characteristics
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of household demographics. The average
household has four members, with 1.6 members as income earners. Based on the
average weekly income, I classify 23.2% of households as poor, with earnings less
than 250,000 Rupiah (about USD$25) per week; 43.3% as low income, with be-
tween 250,000 Rupiah and 500,000 Rupiah (about USD$50) weekly earnings; 23.2%
as middle income, with between 500,000 Rupiah and one million Rupiah (about
USD$100) weekly earnings, and 10.1% of households as high income, with more
than one million Rupiah in earnings per week. Approximately 30% of households
have debts to repay, and the most prevalent form of savings is in cash, followed
by gold or jewelry, financial institutions such as commercial banks, and lastly with
family members.
9It is important to note that the survey team aims to recover as many of the baseline fishermen
as possible without a differential preference over those who have received boat aid.
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Over 97% of households have male households heads, who are 40 years old
on average. Fewer than 5% of household heads have no formal education, about
50% have attended elementary schools, 20% and 15% have attended junior and
senior high schools, and only 2% to 3% have attended college or university across
the survey years. In terms of social integration, approximately 25% of spouses of
household heads attend arisan meetings, a form of community-level rotating credit
organization in Indonesia, and over 50% of household heads attend the fishermen
head meetings.
2.2.2.2 Fishing in Aceh
In Aceh, the traditional fishermen association, Panglima Laot, regulates the fishing
industry. For example, the association certifies who may be boat captains and settles
disputes. In a typical fishing operation, if a fisherman is a boat captain but not a
boat owner, it is likely that the captain has to split the revenue from catch with the
boat owner (Garces et al. 2006). The profit-sharing rule varies by region. Generally,
the boat owner takes 50% to 60% of the profit, of which he gives a 5% to 7% cut
to the captain, who also gets the biggest share of the remaining 40% to 50% of the
profit set aside for crew members (Janssen 2005).
Since the baseline survey in 2005 draws its sample from a list of boat owners,
100% of baseline households in my estimation sample own boats, with 79.7% of
them being boat captains as well. As the 2004 tsunami wiped out 94% of pre-
tsunami fishing boats, both boat ownership and captain status have declined in
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subsequent survey years. In 2007, 61.8% of households own boats, with 49.2% being
captains as well; in 2009, boat ownership has increased, with 70.5% of households
being owners on average, and 43.9% are boat captains. In 2012, boat ownership
declines slightly to return to 2007 levels, with 63.9% of households owning boats
and 43% of households being boat captains. In my estimation sample, less than
10% of households own more than one boat. Thus, I only use information on the
main fishing boat, including its characteristics and catch, in the empirical analyses.
The post-tsunami surveys ask about four types of catch - tuna, small fish,
mollusks and crustaceans - from a typical fishing trip during the week preceding
the survey. However, the large variance in the reported catch for each type of
fish across the survey years suggests that estimates of average catch are likely to
have substantial measurement errors. Thus, I use the reported monetary amounts
received for catch as measures of productivity rather than the reported catch. Since
this financial information is unavailable pre-tsunami, I predict fishing revenue using
reported catch (see equation (2.3) below).
2.2.2.3 Fishing Boat
Table 2.3 presents the average characteristics of each boat type owned by sampled
households. Across all survey rounds, 49.2% of households own a thep− thep, which
is among the smallest of boat types in terms of weight, length, as well as engine
power. On average, all boats owned are approximately seven to eight meters long,
with engine power between 22.3 to 31.7 horsepower. Boats weigh 2.2 metric tons on
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average pre-tsunami, 2.4 metric tons in 2007, 3.9 metric tons in 2009 and 3.8 metric
tons in 2012. The increase in boat weight over time suggests that fishing households
may have upgraded their boats as they recover from loss of fishing productivity in
the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami.
Indeed, Figure 2.2 shows that the distribution of fishing boats owned by the
surveyed fishermen are not constant over time. Although over 50% of fishermen in
all survey years own the smallest boats, such as thep-thep and temple, the percentage
of fishermen owning these small boats is the lowest in 2012. This reduction in small-
boat owners is accompanied by higher percentages of medium-boat owners (darat
and pancing) and big-boat owners (labi-labi and langgar).
To more precisely examine the change in boat types for each fisherman, I
present in Table 2.4 the transition matrices of the types of boat in use in each
post-tsunami survey year with respect to the pre-tsunami boat type. In each of
the matrixes, the post-tsunami boat types are ordered from small to large from
left to right and the pre-tsunami boat types go from small to large from top to
bottom. Thus, the numbers on the diagonal represent the percentages of sampled
fishermen who use the same type of boat post- and pre-tsunami; the numbers below
the diagonal reflect down-sizing and those above the diagonal reflect size upgrades.
Overall, there is evidence of downsizing for the majority of fishermen and only
low incidences of upgrade. In 2007, 46.86% of fishermen are using boats that are
smaller than the pre-tsunami boats. Only 5.57% of fishermen have upgraded their
boats. Specifically, 45.9% of pre-tsunami large boat (labi-labi and langgar) owners
own the smaller thep-thep or temple, with only 32.8% of them retaining a big boat.
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By 2012, however, only 28.79% of pre-tsunami large boat owners still own smaller
boats and nearly half of them have upgraded to the pre-tsunami boat types. In fact,
12.73% of fishermen own boats in 2012 that are bigger than the pre-tsunami boats.
I find similar trends of recovering pre-tsunami boat types among fishermen who
own small and medium boats but at a lower rate. Among pre-tsunami medium-boat
owners, for instance, only 10.2% use the same boat types in 2007 and 23.4% do in
2012. These trends suggest that fishermen who own bigger boats pre-tsunami have
the highest rates of recovering pre-tsunami boat types, due to possible reasons such
as higher productivity or better access to capital. I formally test for the recovery of
pre-tsunami productive capacity in Section 2.4.2 below.
2.2.2.4 Boat Aid
In terms of boat aid, Table 2.2 shows that 63.9% of households in 2007 report having
received an aid boat, which is 3.4 meters long on average. Some households applied
for an aid boat but have not received one by the time of the 2007 survey. Thus,
44.7% of households have received their first aid boat between 2007 and 2009. The
majority (37.1%) of aid boats distributed are thep−theps, followed by 26.88% being
temples and 24.19% being other types. Table 2.5 shows that fishermen who have
lost their pre-tsunami boats as well as those with surviving boats applied for boat
aid. In fact, a higher percentage of pre-tsunami boat survivors applied for boat aid
than that of fishermen who lost their boats.
An important feature of this aid program is that the transfer of aid appears
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to be unconditional on aid application. Panel B of Table 2.5 shows that among
fishermen who have lost their boats, over 90% received aid boats, regardless of aid
application. In contrast, application does seem to matter for the granting of aid
among those with surviving boats. As the third panel shows, 85.3% of those who
have applied for boat aid receive the transfer while only 56.7% of those who did not
apply receive the transfer. I formally test for the exogeneity of boat aid with respect
to aid application in Section 2.3.3 below.
In terms of aid boat usage, among fishermen with surviving boats, 1.89% of
them use the aid boat received as the main fishing boat in 2007 and 5.26% of them
do so in 2009. Among fishermen who lost their pre-tsunami boats, 14.29% use the
aid boat as the main fishing boat in 2007 and 8.52% of them do so in 2009. All of
the fishing boats in use in 2012 have replaced earlier aid boats. This is consistent
with the termination of boat aid after 2009 and the fact that the lifespan of aid
boats are generally shorter than five years. In my empirical analyses, I focus on the
sample of fishermen who lost their pre-tsunami boats.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
My empirical work is motivated by an infinite-time horizon investment model
with a one-time transfer of capital stock (see Appendix A). I make the following as-
sumptions. First, fishermen are endowed with heterogeneous fishing ability. Second,
fishing ability complements physical capital, which is the fishing boat, implying that
fishermen have different optimal boat sizes and types. Third, I assume the presence
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of a functioning boat market.10 Hence, boats are not sticky and fishermen have no
reason to keep the wrong types of boat. This assumption is consistent with the data
used in this study: among fishermen who lost their pre-tsunami boats, only 14.29%
use the aid boat as the main fishing boat in 2007 and 8.52% of them do so in 2009.
2.3.1 Main Equations
In this chapter, I examine whether fishermen who were more productive pre-
tsunami retain their productive edge ex-post, controlling for the receipt and quality
of boat aid. To do so, I estimate two main models. First, I investigate whether the
post-tsunami productive capacity, which is measured by boat length, is influenced
by pre-tsunami productivity and/or boat aid by running the following regression:
Lengthi,k,m,t = ζ0 + ζ1Productivityi,2004 + ζ2Aidi + ζ3AidLengthi
+ τt(Productivityi,2004 ∗ yt) + ϕt(AidLengthi ∗ yt)
+ υk + ωt + εm + ν1
(2.1)
where Length is the length of the current boat in use at time t (where t = 2007, 2009,
2012). Productivityi,2004 is the level of productivity for fisherman i pre-tsunami. Aid
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a household has received a fishing boat on aid
in the period after the baseline survey in 2005 and before the conclusion of the 2009
survey. AidLength is the length of the aid boat received in meters.
To allow for the possibility that the effect of pre-tsunami productivity is dif-
10I argue that the boat market in Aceh is not a market of lemons because there is no asymmetry
of information regarding the quality of boats (Akerlof 1970). If a fisherman owns a bad boat or
the wrong type of boat, he will be able to sell it for the market price.
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ferent from year to year, I interact Productivityi,2004 with year dummies, yt. Hence,
ζ1 represents the effect of pre-tsunami productivity on boat length in 2007, ζ1+τ2009
represents the effect in 2009; and ζ1 + τ2012 represents the effect in 2012. I test the
hypothesis that the effect of pre-tsunami productivity changes over time against the
null that the effect is identical in each year, i.e. ζ1 = ζ1+τ2009 = ζ1+τ2012. Similarly,
I allow the effect of aid boat length on current boat length to be different across
years by interacting AidLengthi with the year dummies. Overall, ζ1 + τt represents
the impact of pre-tsunami productivity on current capital and ζ3 + ϕt represents
the impact of aid capital on current capital. Finally, I include year fixed effects, ωt;
interview month fixed effects, εm; and subdistrict fixed effects, υk.
Second, I wish to examine whether post-tsunami fishing income is impacted
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where R is the reported revenue from catch, including tuna, small fish, mollusks,
and crustaceans, during the last regular fishing trip a week prior to the interview.
To control for within-fisherman correlation, I cluster the standard errors at the
fisherman level when estimating equations (2.1) and (2.2).
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2.3.2 Estimation Approach
The estimation of equations (2.1) and (2.2) is complicated by two factors. The
first is how to measure pre-tsunami productivity. In this chapter, I propose two alter-
native measures. First, I use the reported length of the pre-tsunami boat as a proxy.
The limitation of using pre-tsunami boat length is that it is an indirect measure, as
boat length is likely a function of not only productivity, but also access to capital.
The advantage of boat length is that it is measured exactly. The second measure
of productivity is similar to the measure of efficiency in Krishnan, Nandy and Puri
(2014). Specifically, I estimate a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function for
each fisherman, region and month:
ln(Ri,k,m) = σ0 + σ1Typei + σ2ln(Lengthi) + σ3ln(Hoursi)
+ σ4ln(Lengthi ∗Hoursi) + ak + bm + ν3
(2.3)
where R is the imputed revenue from reported catch during an average pre-tsunami
trip. Type is a vector of pre-tsunami boat type dummies. Length is boat length in
meters, a measure of productive capacity. Hours represents the number of fishing
hours of the average trip, a proxy for the inputs used in the production process. I also
include an interaction term between boat length and hours to allow for differential
effects of fishing hours on productivity across different boat lengths. It is easy to
show that fisherman-level productivity is the residuals from equation (2.3), as they
represent the portions of revenue that cannot be explained by observed boat or
fisherman characteristics alone.
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Since fishing revenue is only reported post-tsunami, I predict pre-tsunami rev-
enue using reported catch pre-tsunami and the relative prices derived from the
relationship between catch and revenue post-tsunami. Although fishing and mar-
ket conditions have likely changed after the tsunami, causing the coefficients that
relate catch to revenue to be different before and after, I argue that this approach
is reasonable because the relative prices of different types of fish have not changed.
According to the Agency for Reconstruction of Aceh (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekon-
struksi), there has been a decline in the supply of fresh fish as well as a decline in
demand due to the loss of purchasing power. Consequently, fresh fish prices have
remained stable compared to pre-tsunami levels, with a small increase in line with
the general price inflation (FAO/WFP 2005). On the whole, the relative prices of
the different species of fish have remained unchanged.
The second complication with estimating equation (2.2) is that the length of
the current boat and pre-tsunami productivity can be endogenous if there are unob-
served fisherman characteristics that affect both. For example, a highly-motivated
fisherman might have both a high level of pre-tsunami productivity and a bigger
fishing boat. To produce unbiased estimates of equation (2.2), I employ a two-stage
least squares approach with aid boat length as the identifying instrument for current
boat length. The first stage is estimated as follows:
Lengthi,k,m,t = φ0 + φ1Productivityi,2004 + φ2Aidi + φ3AidLengthi
+ ηt(Productivityi,2004 ∗ jt) + πk + øt + ςm + ν4
(2.4)
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where ˆLength is the predicted length of the current boat from equation (2.4).
For the length of the aid boat to be a valid instrument, the assignment and
quality of aid boat should be uncorrelated with pre-tsunami productivity and fish-
erman characteristics. If the fishermen who receive aid boats are systematically
different from those who did not, an OLS regression of the impact of aid boat on
fishing productivity will produce biased estimates. Likewise, if fishermen who receive
better quality aid boats were more productive pre-tsunami, the estimated effect of
the quality of aid boats on post-tsunami productivity is biased because the quality
of aid boat is correlated with unobserved fisherman ability.
2.3.3 Assignment of Boat Aid
To determine whether the assignment of aid boats is plausibly exogenous with
respect to pre-tsunami productivity and fisherman characteristics, I first divide the
sample into fishing households that have lost their pre-tsunami boats (80% of the
sample) and those with surviving boats (20% of the sample). Table 2.6 compares
the means of various pre-tsunami characteristics across the two sub-samples. I find
that fishermen who have lost their boats and those with surviving boats are not
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statistically different in terms of their production gear, fishing habits and household
characteristics pre-tsunami. There are differences in other respects, but they are
generally statistically marginal. Specifically, fishermen with surviving boats are
more likely to be indebted, have fewer income earners in the household, are more
likely to fish near shore and less likely to do so within the lagoon (significant at
the 10% level). A regression explaining boat survival confirms that pre-tsunami
characteristics including these factors do not predict boat survival but kecamatan
dummies do. This result suggests that boat survival is purely due to the pre-tsunami
geographical location of the fishermen.
Table 2.7 shows, however, that in the post-tsunami years 2007, 2009 and 2012,
the average boat characteristics across the sub-samples are statistically different
from one another. Although the sample of fishermen with lost boats are given longer
aid boats in 2007 or 2009, their current boat lengths are shorter than fishermen with
surviving boats (significant at the 1% levels). Unsurprisingly, I find that fishermen
with surviving boats report slightly higher fishing revenue than those with lost boats
(significant at the 10% level). These comparisons show that the fishermen who did
and who did not lose their boats are not identical, suggesting that they should be
treated separately in subsequent analyses.
To check that the assignment of boat aid is plausibly exogenous, I estimate
the following probit model separately for each sub-sample:
P (Aidi,k = 1) = F (ψ0 + ψ1Productivityi + ψ2Applyi + ψ3Debti + ψ4Hi + dk) (2.6)
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where all variables are at the fishing household level and all independent variables
are at the pre-tsunami levels. Productivity is the measure of productivity using the
residuals from the estimation of imputed revenue in equation (2.3). In an alternative
specification, the pre-tsunami boat length in meters is used in place of Productivity
as a direct measure of productive capacity. Apply is a dummy variable that equals 1
if the household has submitted an application for boat aid post-tsunami. Debt is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the household has outstanding loans. H is a vector
of variables depicting household head characteristics, including his age, education,
and whether his father was a fishermen. The test of exogeneity is to reject the null
hypothesis that at least one of the coefficients is not zero. A particular concern
over the exogeneity of boat aid is that its assignment can be explained by pre-
tsunami productivity. Thus, I test the hypothesis that ψ1 = 0 against the null that
pre-tsunami productivity predicts aid boat assignment.
To check that more productive fishermen pre-tsunami were not given bigger













k + ν6 (2.7)
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 2.8 show that among fishermen who lost their
boats, the assignment and quality of boat aid, measured by length, are uncorrelated
with both measures of pre-tsunami productivity (residuals from equation (2.3) and
boat length), as well as pre-tsunami household characteristics and aid application.
In addition to evaluating the predictive powers of each individual variable, I also test
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that groups of variables may be jointly significant predictors of aid boat assignment.
Specifically, I examine the joint significance of groups of variables that depict the
education levels of the household head and other household characteristics. The F-
statistics are displayed in the table. In these tests, I fail to reject the null hypotheses
that the coefficients on these variables are jointly zero.
Columns (5) to (8) show that among fishermen with surviving boats, those
who have submitted an application for boat aid are more likely to receive an aid
boat (significant at the 1% level) and to receive bigger aid boats (significant at
the 5% level). This result suggests any analysis on the sample of fishermen with
surviving boats should account for the selection into aid application. One way to
do so is to estimate a probit model on the relevant fishermen to explain boat aid
application:
P (Applyi,k = 1) = G(ξ0 + ξ1Owneri + ξ2Lengthi + ξ3Debti + ξ4Hi + sk) (2.8)
where Apply is a dummy that equals 1 if fisherman i has submitted an application for
boat aid post-tsunami. I then use equation (2.8) to form inverse probability weights
and use them to control for selection into aid application (Wooldridge 2007).
Overall, as shown in Table 2.8, I find that the assignment of boat aid is unre-
lated to levels of pre-tsunami productivity. The only statistically significant predic-
tors of the assignment of boat aid in both sub-samples are the kecamatan dummies.
This result implies that certain kecamatan qualities may have led to its adoption by
a certain NGO, resulting in a particular kind of aid delivery. Thus, in my analysis
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of the impact of boat aid on productivity, I include kecamatan fixed effects.
2.3.4 Selection into the Sample
For robustness, I check the probability of selection into the survey and into
fishing in each post-tsunami survey round. I assume that selection into the initial
survey is exogenous and I am only concerned about selection into (i.e. attrition out
of) subsequent survey years.11 I estimate the probit model:
P (samplei,k,t = 1) = Φ(δ0 + δ1Aidi + δ2AidLengthi + δ3Owneri,t + δ4Xi,t + αk + γt)
(2.9)
where sample is a dummy variable that equals 1 if fishing household i from keca-
matan k at time t (where t = 2007, 2009, 2012) is present in each post-tsunami
survey year. Owner is a dummy variable that equals 1 if at least one household
member is a boat owner. X is a vector of variables depicting characteristics of the
household head, including his age, education, and whether his father was a fisher-
men. αk is a set of kecamatan dummies that control for kecamatan-specific qualities,
including distance from the capital of the province, Banda Aceh, which has the the
highest NGO presence, and others that are otherwise unobserved in the data. γt
represents year fixed effects.
Specification (1) in Table 2.9 shows evidence of selection on observables. Among
the statistically significant predictors of whether a household is present in each post-
11The 2007 survey recovers two-thirds of the fishing households that were surveyed in the 2005
baseline survey. If reasons for households to be lost in 2007 are correlated with outcome variables
of interest in this study, estimates will be biased.
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tsunami survey round, the impact of receiving an aid boat is the strongest. A pre-
tsunami fishing household who has received an aid boat is more likely to be present
in the sample by 8.6 percentage points (significant at the 1% level). However, only
the receipt of aid boat matters while the value of the boat as a productive asset, as
measured by length, does not predict attrition from the sample.
Boat ownership decreases the probability of presence in the sample by 7.03
percentage points (significant at the 1% level) while attendance of arisan meetings
or fishermen head meetings, which are proxies for the extent of social integration at
the household level, has no such predictive power. This result suggests that attrition
may be a result of relocation and households who own boats are more able to move.
A limitation of these data is that this hypothesis cannot be tested empirically.
Pre-tsunami income levels also affect the probability of presence in the post-
tsunami sample. In particular, compared with high-income households - those with
average weekly income of more than one million Rupiah (about USD$100) - poor
households with average weekly income of less than 250,000 Rupiah (about USD$25)
pre-tsunami are less likely to attrite from the sample by 4.1 percentage points (sig-
nificant at the 10% level). Similarly, low income households with between 250,000
and 500,000 Rupiah (about USD$25 to $50) in average weekly income have a 5.3
percentage points lower probability to attrite (significant at the 5% level). These re-
sults suggest that households with higher income pre-tsunami have more options to
relocate post-tsunami and are less likely to stay in the sample. This interpretation
is consistent with the estimated impact of boat ownership discussed above.
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2.3.5 Selection into Fishing
While the baseline survey is drawn from a universe of pre-tsunami fishing
households, not all of the original households keep fishing in subsequent years. In
principle, one keeps fishing if profits or income from fishing are greater than those
from alternate occupations. Since I do not observe income from alternate sources
among fishermen, I estimate the probability of fishing using the probit model:















where fishi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if household i has at least one member
that reports fishing as his primary activity. Lengthi,2004 is the length of the pre-
tsunami fishing boat. µm is a set of interview month dummies that capture the
seasonality of fishing and other occupations in Aceh. The regressors in equation
(2.10) capture the determinants of income from fishing and other types of work.
Column (2) in Table 2.9 shows results from equation (2.10) while column
(3) shows results of the same model estimated with inverse probability weights
that account for selection bias into the sample (see Section 2.3.4). The signs and
magnitudes of the explanatory variables are similar across specifications with and
without weights, suggesting that the size of the selection bias is small.
I find that the receipt of boat aid not only explains presence in the sample,
but it is also a strong predictor of whether a household participates in fishing in
each post-tsunami survey round. Results from the model with inverse probability
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weights that control for sample selection show that a household that receives an
aid boat are more likely to continue fishing post-tsunami by 24.6 percentage points
(significant at the 5% level). Since the survival rate of boats post-tsunami is under
6% (Henderson and Lee 2014), the positive impact of boat aid on the probability
of post-tsunami fishing suggests that boat aid is useful in sustaining household
participation in fishing. The statistically insignificant effect of the length of aid boats
highlights the importance of boat aid itself, regardless of its quality, on sustaining
household participation in fishing.
In addition, pre-tsunami income levels are important predictors of whether a
household continues to fish or not post-tsunami. While poor and low-income house-
holds are more likely to stay in the sample compared with high-income households,
they are less likely to continue fishing. Poor households are less likely to fish by 22.3
percentage points (significant at the 5% level) in the weighted model, while low-
income households are less likely to fish by 15.6 percentage points (significant at the
10% level) and mid-income households do so by 19.2 percentage points (significant
at the 5% level). This result suggests that households who are poorer pre-tsunami
may have quit fishing to look for occupations with higher returns post-tsunami.
Overall, the magnitude of the impact of pre-tsunami income levels is comparable
but smaller than that of boat aid, suggesting that both boat aid and pre-tsunami




The main goal of this chapter is to estimate the returns to capital and ability
in the short- and medium-run by studying the post-tsunami performance among
fishermen who lost their pre-tsunami boats. In Table 2.10, columns (1) and (2)
display results of equation (2.1) in which I use post-tsunami boat length as a measure
of productive capacity. Using the residuals from equation (2.3) as measures of pre-
tsunami productivity in column (1), I find that its impact on current boat length
is statistically insignificant except in 2012, when a 10% increase in the unpredicted
fishing revenue pre-tsunami, as a measure of inherent fishing ability or productivity,
increases the current boat length post-tsunami by 1.65 meters (significant at the 5%
level).12
Using pre-tsunami boat length as an alternative proxy for pre-tsunami perfor-
mance in column (2), I find that the impact of pre-tsunami boat length on current
boat length is positive and statistically significant, with the biggest impact in 2012.
For each additional meter of the pre-tsunami boat, the current boat length is 0.174
to 0.258 meter longer in the post-tsunami years (significant at the 5% levels). Thus,
the impact of pre-tsunami productivity or inherent ability on post-tsunami produc-
tive capacity increases over time.
12In Table 2.10, column (1), the effect of pre-tsunami productivity in 2007 is the coefficient
-0.0925. The effect in 2009 is the sum of the coefficients -0.0925 and 0.0951. Similarly, the effect
in 2012 is the sum of -0.0925 and 0.257, which equals 0.1645. The interpretation of the impacts of
pre-tsunami boat length, aid boat length, and instrumented current boat length in Tables 2.10 to
2.13 follows the same logic.
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The impact of aid boat length on current boat length is also positive and
statistically significant (at the 1% level) across both specifications. However, the
impact peaks in 2009 and becomes smaller by 2012. In column (1), for instance, the
negative coefficient of -4.967 on the aid boat dummy shows that among fishermen
who lost their pre-tsunami boats, those who have an aid boat end up having smaller
boats than those who did not receive aid. Taking the ratio of this coefficient on that
of the aid boat length, I find that only receiving an aid boat that is at least 7.19
meters has a positive effect on current boat length in 2007 (statistically significant
at the 1% level). By 2012, only fishermen who receive an aid boat of at least 10.52
meters has a positive effect on current boat length (statistically significant at the 1%
level). An F statistic of 5.85 allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the impact
of aid boat length is equal in each post-tsunami year (significant at the 10% level).
The magnitude and sign of the coefficients remain consistent in column (2). Thus,
I conclude that the impact of aid boat length on post-tsunami productive capacity
diminishes over time.
Column (3) shows results of estimating equation (2.2), which uses fishing rev-
enue as the measure of post-tsunami performance. Consistent with the impact on
post-tsunami boat length, I find that pre-tsunami productivity has an increasing
and positive effect on fishing income. In 2007, fishermen with a 10% higher pre-
tsunami productivity has 0.83% lower fishing income but 0.5% higher income in
2012. In terms of aid boat, I also find consistent evidence that its returns on fishing
revenue diminishes over time. Specifically, the impact peaks in 2009, when receiving
an aid boat of 6.53 meters or longer leads to higher fishing revenue than otherwise
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(significant at the 1% level).
Columns (4) and (5) show the two-stage least squares results from equations
(2.4) and (2.5). Column (4) presents the first-stage estimation, in which aid boat
length is a strong and positive predictor of current boat length, with a chi-squared
statistic of 70.27 (significant at the 1% level). Column (5) shows the second-stage
result that the impact of instrumented current boat length on fishing revenue also
diminishes over time, with its peak in 2009. An additional 10 meters in current boat
length is associated with 2.7% more in fishing revenue in 2009 and 2.06% more in
2012. Overall, I fail to reject that the returns to aid boat length in terms of current
length in each post-tsunami year are statistically identical. However, the finding
that returns to innate fisherman ability, as reflected by pre-tsunami productivity,
are the highest in 2012 and that the returns to aid boat are the lowest suggest that
the redistributive effects of boat aid are small and temporary.
As a robustness check, I estimate the main equations (2.1) and (2.2) with three
sets of inverse probability weights to account for different possible types of selection
bias. Table 2.11 shows estimation results with weights that control for selection into
the full sample; Table 2.12 presents results that incorporate weights to control for
selection into fishing; Table 2.13 shows weighted results that control for selection
into application for boat aid. In all three exercises, I find consistent results with
the unweighted analysis in Table 2.10, suggesting that my main results are robust
to specifications that account for possible selection biases.
A second robustness check is provided in Table 2.17 of Appendix B, which
repeats the analysis in Table 2.10 using a pooled sample that includes fishermen
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with surviving boats. I allow for different sets of coefficients for fishermen with
and without surviving boats and test for their equality. Statistical tests show that
I cannot reject that all of the coefficients are equal across the two sub-samples.
Thus, in Table 2.18, I repeat the analysis in Table 2.17 but impose the same set of
coefficients on the two groups of fishermen because the former sub-sample consists
of fewer observations and may result in the lack of statistical power. Overall, results
from the pooled sample are consistent with that shown in Table 2.10.
Another robustness check confirms that the estimation of pre-tsunami pro-
ductivity is not sensitive to the assumption of the Cobb-Douglas functional form.
Specifically, I estimate a translog production function with boat length and fishing
hours as the two inputs in the production of fishing and take the residuals as mea-
sures of pre-tsunami productivity. I obtain estimates that are similar to those from
equation (2.3). Table 2.19 repeats the main estimations (2.1) and (2.2) with the
use of pre-tsunami productivity derived from the translog function. The estimated
coefficients of the residuals are consistent in their signs and magnitude with those
of the residuals from equation (2.3).13
A related robustness check ensures that results from the main equations (2.1)
and (2.2) are robust to the use of pre-tsunami productivity as a proxy for fishermen’s
innate ability. Specifically, I estimate a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function
for each fisherman, region and month with the log of pre-tsunami fishing revenue
per meter of the pre-tsunami boat as the dependent variable. Thus, the resulting
13Coefficients of the residuals from the translog production function are no more or less than
15% different from those of residuals from the Cobb-Douglas production function.
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residuals measure fisherman-level productivity per meter of the fishing boat. Table
2.20 presents the estimation of equations (2.1) and (2.2) with the use of per-unit
pre-tsunami productivity. The estimated coefficients of the residuals are consistent
in their signs and magnitude with those of the residuals from equation (2.3).14
A final robustness check ensures that the estimation results of the main equa-
tions (2.1) and (2.2) are unbiased by observations from kecamatans where 100% of
fishermen who lost their pre-tsunami boats receive aid boats, regardless of aid ap-
plication.15 Specifically, Table 2.21 repeats the analysis of Table 2.10 by restricting
the sample to fishermen from kecamatans with less than 100% delivery of aid boats.
The signs and magnitudes of coefficients from this restricted sample are consistent
with those from the full estimation sample. Thus, including fishermen from keca-
matans where all fishermen with lost boats receive a replacement does not bias the
main results.
2.4.2 Long-Term Impact of Boat Aid
In this chapter, I also wish to examine whether fishermen are able to upgrade
and/or return to their pre-tsunami productive capacity. Hence, I run the following
regression to estimate the determinants of the latest available post-tsunami boat
length:
14Coefficients of the per-unit residuals are no more or less than 15% different from those presented
in Table 2.10.
15Of the ten kecamatans surveyed, three of them have 100% aid boat delivery among fishermen
who lost their pre-tsunami boats. These kecamantans are Lhok Nga, Leupung, and Jaya.
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Lengthi,k,t = κ0 + κ1Lengthi,2004 + κ2AidLengthi + κ3Agei,t
+ κ4Age
2
i,t + κ5Fatheri + ck + ν7
(2.11)
where t is the last survey year when information on the length of the boat is available
for fisherman i. Age is the age of fisherman i at time t; and Father is a dummy that
equals 1 if his father was also a fisherman. I wish to test the following hypotheses:
(i) κ1 = 1, (ii) κ2 = 0, and (iii) κ1 is statistically different from κ2.
Table 2.14 presents the results of estimating equation (2.11). Among fisher-
men with lost boats, 19.92% of current boats are received with aid, suggesting that
aid boats do not stick. Moreover, I find that pre-tsunami boat length is a strong
predictor of current boat length. Column (1) shows that for each additional meter
of the pre-tsunami boat, the current boat is 0.27 meters longer while the equiva-
lent impact of aid boat is 0.17 meter (significant at the 5% level). As column (2)
shows, I find consistent results after controlling for fisherman characteristics. In
both specifications, I can strongly reject that pre-tsunami boat length has a one-to-
one relationship with current boat length (significant at the 1% level). I also reject
that aid boat length has no impact on current boat length (significant at the 5%
level). Overall, I cannot reject that the impacts of aid boat and pre-tsunami boat
lengths on current boat length are identical.
Among fishermen with surviving boats, only 6.45% of the boats currently in
use are still the aid boats.16 I also find evidence that the pre-tsunami boat length
16Table 2.8 shows that aid application matters for the receipt and quality of aid only among
37
is a stronger predictor of current boat length than aid boat length. Specifically, for
each additional meter of the pre-tsunami boat, the current boat is 0.66 meter longer
(significant at the 1% level). However, the impact of aid boat length on current
boat length is statistically insignificant. Similar to the sub-sample of fishermen who
lost their pre-tsunami boats, I can strongly reject that pre-tsunami boat length has
a one-to-one relationship with current boat length among fishermen with surviving
boats (significant at the 5% level). However, in contrast to columns (1) and (2), I
cannot reject that aid boat length has no impact on current boat length. Therefore,
I can conclude that the impacts of aid boat and pre-tsunami boat lengths on current
boat length are statistically different (significant at the 1% level).
Overall, the consistent finding in both groups of fishermen that pre-tsunami
boat length is a statistically significant and positive predictor of the post-tsunami
equivalent suggests that controlling for the in-kind transfer of boats, functioning
markets allow fishermen to recover their pre-tsunami productive capacity, which I
measure with boat length. Testing the equality of the coefficients on aid boat length
from columns (1) and (3), i.e. comparing 0.171 with 0.0875, the t-statistic is 0.698.
The equivalent test on the coefficients from columns (2) and (4), i.e. comparing
0.170 with 0.0224, generates a t-statistic of 1.475. In both cases, I fail to reject the
null that the estimated impact of aid boat length on current boat length is identical
across the two sub-samples.
To check that these results are robust and not driven by the current boat
fishermen with surviving boats. Thus, I only include inverse probability weights from equation
(2.8) in Table 2.14 to control for selection into aid application for the sub-sample of fishermen with
surviving boats.
38
being the aid boat itself, I restrict the sample to fishermen who no longer use the
aid boat. Table 2.15 shows the estimation results. I find that the signs of coefficients
are consistent with those in Table 2.14. However, coefficients on the pre-tsunami
boat length are larger in magnitude. Among fishermen who lost their pre-tsunami
boats, for instance, each additional meter of the pre-tsunami boat is associated with
an additional 0.36 meter in current boat length while the equivalent impact of aid
boat is 0.16 meter (significant at the 1% and 5% levels). However, I cannot reject
the null that the impacts of pre-tsunami and aid boat lengths are identical. Testing
the equality of the coefficients on aid boat length from columns (1) and (3), i.e.
comparing 0.157 with 0.0963, the t-statistic is 0.458. The equivalent test on the
coefficients from columns (2) and (4), i.e. comparing 0.155 with 0.0231, generates
a t-statistic of 1.256. Therefore, in both cases, I fail to reject the null that the
estimated impact of aid boat length on current boat length is identical across the
two sub-samples.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, I use a unique setting in which a natural disaster removed ex-
isting differentials in capital stock, which is then quasi-randomly reassigned through
an aid program, to estimate the returns to capital and inherent ability in the short-
and medium-run. Using data on Indonesian fishermen who were severely affected
by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, I find that boat aid increases overall produc-
tivity as the returns to aid boat length in terms of post-tsunami boat length and
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fishing revenue are positive. However, these returns diminish over time. The returns
to pre-tsunami productivity are also positive, suggesting that fishermen who were
more productive pre-tsunami retain their productive edge ex-post. Moreover, these
returns increase over time. Thus, I conclude that returns to inherent ability are
more important than returns to capital in the long run. In addition, boat aid helps
restore the pre-disaster equilibrium but the redistributive effects on productivity are
small and temporary.
The finding of this study has important policy implications. In particular, I
find that the receipt of boat aid increases the probability of household participation
in fishing post-tsunami. Given that the tsunami has a devastating impact on the
fishing industry ex-post, in addition to the expansion of the construction sector, this
result suggests that in-kind transfer of the essential productive capital (in this case,
a fishing boat) may be used as an effective policy instrument to retain participation
in the industry that has suffered the most direct blow from a natural disaster.
Second, the results in this chapter imply the existence of markets for aid boats
such that aid boats are either directly useful or can be sold for their value. In
particular, I show that the length of the latest post-tsunami boat is positively and
more strongly correlated with the pre-tsunami boat length than the aid boat length.
This result suggests that fishermen are able to sell their aid boats in exchange for
boats that are similar to their pre-tsunami types. Since boat length is an important
determinant of productivity, this finding suggests that fishermen tend to go back to
their pre-tsunami productive equilibrium.
If the objective of the capital transfer was to restore the pre-disaster equilib-
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rium, then the result of this chapter points to a successful aid program. However,
these results also suggest that returns to inherent fishing ability are more important
than returns to the infusion of capital in the long run. That is, more productive
fishermen pre-tsunami end up retaining their productive edge ex-post, despite the
quality of aid boat received. Hence, investments in human capital rather than a sim-
ple infusion of physical capital may be more effective in reducing the productivity
gap among fishermen in Aceh.
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Figure 2.1: Map of Survey Area





























Source: Henderson and Lee (2014) 
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Notes: The figure shows a map of the survey area, with a blow-up (right side in figure) of the Banda Aceh area 
(upper-left part of coastal area). 1 We cover all villages in three contiguous districts (Banda Aceh, Aceh Jaya, and 
Aceh Besar) going south and north-east of the capital Banda Aceh. In addition we covered the fishing villages in 
two other districts, up to a defined geographic limit moving east from Banda Aceh into Pidie (the last sub-district 
surveyed is Meurah Dua) and moving south into Aceh Barat (the last sub-district surveyed is Meuruebo). These 
include villages on islands offshore. The map shows household survival rates by village (yellow being the worst). 
Unfortunately, the map is based on the post-tsunami government rendering of village boundaries which is grossly 
inaccurate. We took GPS readings of the center (the mosque) of the living area of each village. In only 6% of the 
cases is the GPS reading within the supposed village boundaries. In 15% of the cases, it is over 10 kilometers away. 
Coastal villages are drawn as non-coastal and vice-versa which explains why, in parts of the map, a yellow (low 
survival) village may be shown next to a supposed coastal village which is dark (high survival). Nevertheless the 
map depicts the general survey area.   
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Table 2.4: Transition Matrixes of Boat Types
2004 boat types Other Thep-thep & Temple Darat & Pancing Palung Labi-labi & Langgar Total
Other
Thep-thep & Temple 0.2695 0.6484 0.0568 0 0.0253 1
Darat & Pancing 0.2653 0.5969 0.102 0 0.0357 1
Palung 0.1509 0.4151 0 0.434 0 1
Labi-labi & Langgar 0.0328 0.459 0.1803 0 0.3279 1
Total 0.242 0.6051 0.0739 0.0293 0.0497 1
Note: % with the same type of boat = 47.27%; % upgraded = 5.57%; % downgraded = 46.86%.     
2004 boat types Other Thep-thep & Temple Darat & Pancing Palung Labi-labi & Langgar Total
Other 0 1 0 0 0 1
Thep-thep & Temple 0.22 0.7378 0.0156 0.0178 0.0089 1
Darat & Pancing 0.2431 0.6464 0.0663 0.0221 0.0221 1
Palung 0.1176 0.2353 0 0.6471 0 1
Labi-labi & Langgar 0.087 0.5217 0 0 0.3913 1
Total 0.2112 0.6783 0.0266 0.0476 0.0364 1
Note: % with the same type of boat = 53.63%; % upgraded = 4.32%; % downgraded = 42.06%.     
2004 boat types Other Thep-thep & Temple Darat & Pancing Palung Labi-labi & Langgar Total
Other 1 0 0 0 0
Thep-thep & Temple 0.2876 0.5226 0.109 0.0226 0.0583 1
Darat & Pancing 0.0935 0.6355 0.2336 0.0187 0.0187 1
Palung 0 0.4 0 0.6 0 1
Labi-labi & Langgar 0.1212 0.2879 0.1212 0 0.4697 1
Total 0.2161 0.5245 0.1355 0.0467 0.0771 1




Table 3 Transi n Matrixes of Boat Types
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Table 2.5: Pre-Tsunami Boat Survival, Aid Boat Application and Grant
Panel&A:&Boat&Survival&and&Aid&Boat&Application
Pre-Tsunami Boat Survival Yes No Total
Yes 51.95% 48.05% 77
No 45.89% 54.11% 401
Total 224 254 478
Panel&B:&Aid&Boat&Application&andGrant&Among&Fishermen&who&Lost&Boats
Aid Application Yes No Total
Yes 91.27% 8.73% 126
No 92.09% 7.91% 139
Total 243 22 265
Panel&C:&Aid&Boat&Application&and&Grant&Among&Fishermen&with&Surviving&Boats
Aid Application Yes No Total
Yes 85.29% 14.71% 34
No 56.67% 43.33% 30




Table 4 Pre-Tsunami Boat Survival, Aid Boat Application and Grant
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Table 2.6: Descriptive Statistics: Pre-Tsunami Characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES A: Sample (survived boats) B: Sample (lost boats) A-B
Pre-tsunami:
Productivity (residuals) 0.0702 0.0385 0.0317
(0.216) (0.153) (0.126)
Boat length 9.0588 8.612 0.447
(0.562) (0.305) (0.620)
Indebted 0.491 0.355 0.135*
(0.0707) (0.0389) (0.0787)
Age 41.56 40.967 0.593
(1.288) (0.915) (1.651)
Household size 5.039 5.197 -0.158
(0.274) (0.146) (0.299)
No school 0.12 0.0656 0.0544
(0.0464) (0.0225) (0.0460)
Elementary 0.62 0.582 0.0380
(0.0693) (0.0448) (0.0829)
Junior high school 0.140 0.230 -0.0895
(0.0496) (0.0382) (0.0677)
Senior high school or above 0.12 0.123 -0.00295
(0.0464) (0.0299) (0.0553)
Father was a fisherman 0.06 0.0492 0.0108
(0.0339) (0.0197) (0.0376)
Wife attends arisan meetings 0.275 0.289 -0.0150
(0.0631) (0.0369) (0.0735)
Number of income earners 1.353 1.684 -0.331*
(0.111) (0.0931) (0.173)
Fishing near shore 0.0588 0.0132 0.0457*
(0.0333) (0.00927) (0.0250)
Fishing within lagoon 0.236 0.362 -0.127*
(0.0600) (00391) (0.0759)
Fishing outside lagoon 0.588 0.553 0.0356
(0.0696) (0.0405) (0.0807)
Fishing at deep sea 0.118 0.0723 0.0453
(0.0456) (0.0211) (0.0449)
Fishing hours 21.255 16.856 4.400
(5.539) (2.415) (5.257)
Number of crew 3.824 3.358 0.466
(0.718) (0.342) (0.718)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5A Descriptive Statistics: Pre-tsunami characteristics
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Table 2.7: Descriptive Statistics: Post-Tsunami Characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES A: Sample (survived boats) B: Sample (lost boats) A-B
Post-tsunami:
Fishing revenue 1,646,548 1,203,797 442,750.8*
(295,849.7) (88,078.78) (229,932)
Boat length 8.639 7.391 1.247***
(0.344) (0.121) (0.296)
Aid boat length 5.597 6.722 -1.126***
(0.452) (0.131) (0.350)
Household size 3.829 4.008 -0.179
(0.125) (0.0712) (0.157)
Fishing near shore 0.230 0.240 -0.00967
(0.0343) (0.0172) (0.0386)
Fishing within lagoon 0.368 0.364 0.00449
(0.0393) (0.0193) (0.0436)
Fishing outside lagoon 0.329 0.290 0.0391
(0.0382) (0.0182) (0.0414)
Fishing at deep sea 0.0197 0.0129 0.00685
(0.0113) (0.00453) (0.0107)
Fishing hours 14.462 11.493 2.969*
(1.867) (0.754) (1.766)
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5B Descriptive Sta istics: Post-tsunami characteristic
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Table 2.8: Assignment of Boat Aid
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Applied for boat aid 0.0706 0.0705* 0.702 0.914 0.365*** 0.367*** 2.407 3.616**
(0.0388) (0.0334) (0.583) (0.650) (0.0924) (0.0682) (1.294) (1.002)
Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) -0.00939 -0.360 -0.00554 -1.247
(0.0290) (0.433) (0.0915) (0.929)
Pre-tsunami boat length 7.24e-06 0.147* 0.000537 0.242
(0.00985) (0.0755) (0.0136) (0.133)
Indebted -0.0370 -0.0384 -1.161 -0.738 -0.124 -0.115 -2.511 -0.878
(0.0759) (0.0748) (1.671) (1.286) (0.217) (0.138) (2.258) (1.642)
Age -0.0145 -0.00886 0.106 0.237 -0.133*** -0.136* 0.240 -0.558
(0.0214) (0.0182) (0.130) (0.239) (0.0269) (0.0638) (0.805) (1.070)
Age squared 0.000156 9.44e-05 -0.00114 -0.00267 0.00155*** 0.00160* -0.00218 0.00769
(0.000235) (0.000216) (0.00165) (0.00282) (0.000351) (0.000762) (0.00997) (0.0136)
i: Elementary 0.247 0.237 3.033* 3.283 -0.0873 -0.0846 -1.181 -0.535
(0.187) (0.185) (1.581) (1.877) (0.0604) (0.0803) (1.843) (1.698)
ii: Junior high school 0.247 0.241 3.775* 3.777* -0.314 -0.321 -0.443 -1.788
(0.165) (0.179) (1.713) (1.940) (0.234) (0.271) (3.044) (2.803)
iii: Senior high school or above 0.247 0.247 1.351 1.589 -0.459 -0.455 -3.111 -2.918
(0.192) (0.186) (1.979) (1.936) (0.379) (0.378) (4.613) (4.087)
a: Father was a fisherman 0.0415 0.0420 -0.862 -0.446 -0.0161 -0.0302 2.205 -0.179
(0.169) (0.174) (1.638) (1.350) (0.188) (0.179) (4.031) (5.118)
b: Wife attends arisan meetings -0.00704 -0.0133 1.087 0.726 0.0370 0.0350 0.854 -0.0298
(0.0829) (0.0718) (1.699) (1.375) (0.191) (0.201) (2.286) (1.661)
Constant 0.805 0.702 -0.627 -4.193 3.277*** 3.332** -2.445 10.67
(0.528) (0.421) (2.894) (5.427) (0.675) (1.349) (15.31) (20.11)
Sub-district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistcs of testing:
(education vars) i=ii=iii=0 0.76 0.67 2.15 1.78 1.50 2.02 0.44 0.26
(household head vars) a=b=0 0.29 0.13 0.26 0.20 0.04 0.03 0.24 0.00
Observations 108 112 107 111 48 48 45 45
R-squared 0.217 0.217 0.259 0.260 0.392 0.392 0.455 0.430
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at thesub-district (kecamantan) level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6 Assignment of Boat Aid 
Sample (survived boats)Sample (lost boats)
aid (dummy) aid boat length aid (dummy) aid boat length
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Table 2.9: Probit Model of Selection into Sample and Fishing
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES presence in sample
weighted
Boat aid (dummy) 0.0865*** 0.232** 0.246**
(0.0208) (0.101) (0.102)
Aid boat length 0.000796 0.00490 0.00312
(0.00290) (0.0126) (0.0127)
Pre-tsunami boat length 0.00227 0.000167 0.00211
(0.00153) (0.00506) (0.00534)
Poor 0.0413* -0.222** -0.223**
(0.0231) (0.0874) (0.0896)
Low income 0.0533** -0.159* -0.156*
(0.0216) (0.0834) (0.0862)
Middle income 0.0229 -0.188** -0.192**
(0.0310) (0.0838) (0.0861)
Household size 0.00191 -0.00293 -0.00589
(0.00423) (0.0109) (0.0112)




Wife attends arisan meetings 0.0219
(0.0148)
Attends fishermen meetings -0.0184
(0.0183)
Bank savings -0.131*** -0.136***
(0.0446) (0.0457)
Sub-district FE No Yes Yes
Interview month FE No Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 705 535 530
Note: Marginal effects are reported.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
household fishing
Table 7 Probit Model of Sel ction into Sampl   i g
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Table 2.10: Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami Performance among Fishermen with
Lost Boats (unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES 1st stage IV
Log fishing revenue Current boat length Log fishing revenue
a: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) -0.0925 -0.0825* -0.0986 -0.0609
(0.0700) (0.0458) (0.0727) (0.0460)
b: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2009 0.0951 0.117* 0.0913 0.0925
(0.0945) (0.0708) (0.104) (0.0698)
c: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2012 0.257** 0.134** 0.289** 0.0735
(0.100) (0.0670) (0.116) (0.0687)
d: Pre-tsunami boat length 0.242**
(0.117)
e: Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2009 -0.0680
(0.0855)
f: Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2012 0.0160
(0.122)
Boat aid (dummy) -4.967*** -5.086*** -1.099*** -4.919*** -0.0183
(0.774) (0.691) (0.335) (0.745) (0.219)
g: Aid boat length 0.691*** 0.673*** 0.126*** 0.646***
(0.126) (0.107) (0.0423) (0.0770)
h: Aid boat length X Yr2009 0.103 0.106 0.0451
(0.107) (0.103) (0.0425)
i: Aid boat length X Yr2012 -0.219* -0.207* 0.00803
(0.128) (0.123) (0.0466)
j: Current boat length(instrumented) 0.171**
(0.0688)
k: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2009 0.102*
(0.0607)
l: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2012 0.0351
(0.0775)
Constant 7.047*** 5.636*** 13.45*** 7.253*** 12.04***
(0.803) (0.876) (0.573) (0.651) (0.736)
Chi squared statistic of testing:
a = a+b =a+ c 6.60** - 5.16* - 2.17
d =d+e = d+f - 0.99 - - -
g =g+h = g+i 5.85* 6.21** 1.66 - -
j =j+k = j+l - - - - 3.52
Aid boat length (instrument) = 0 - - - 70.27*** -
Observations 264 499 262 264 262
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include sub-district (kecamantan), interview month, and year fixed effects.
Table 8A Impact of oat Aid on Post-Tsunami Performance among Fishermen with Lost Boats (unweighted)
Current boat length
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Table 2.11: Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami Performance among Fishermen with
Lost Boats (weighted to control for selection into the full sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES 1st stage IV
Log fishing revenue Current boat length Log fishing revenue
a: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) -0.0476 -0.129* -0.0573 -0.123*
(0.0891) (0.0668) (0.0938) (0.0712)
b: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2009 0.0654 0.190* 0.0580 0.182*
(0.130) (0.0969) (0.140) (0.0989)
c: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2012 0.221 0.197** 0.252* 0.142
(0.140) (0.0955) (0.149) (0.0994)
d: Pre-tsunami boat length 0.420**
(0.164)
e: Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2009 -0.193
(0.179)
f: Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2012 -0.211
(0.165)
Boat aid (dummy) -4.895*** -4.427*** -0.987*** -4.783*** 0.0451
(0.806) (0.727) (0.348) (0.977) (0.236)
g: Aid boat length 0.677*** 0.695*** 0.117** 0.628***
(0.101) (0.0894) (0.0542) (0.108)
h: Aid boat length X Yr2009 0.0899 0.00748 0.0265
(0.121) (0.120) (0.0561)
i: Aid boat length X Yr2012 -0.173 -0.259** 0.0366
(0.120) (0.105) (0.0544)
j: Current boat length(instrumented) 0.145
(0.0910)
k: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2009 0.111
(0.0973)
l: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2012 0.0938
(0.101)
Constant 7.063*** 3.176** 13.47*** 7.195*** 12.29***
(0.844) (1.414) (0.668) (0.767) (0.954)
Chi squared statistic of testing:
a = a+b =a+ c 1.26 - 2.83* - 1.90
d =d+e = d+f - 0.85 - - -
g =g+h = g+i 2.17 3.22** 0.23 - -
j =j+k = j+l - - - - 0.7
Aid boat length (instrument) = 0 - - - 33.53*** -
Observations 201 209 196 201 196
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include sub-district (kecamantan), interview month, and year fixed effects.
Table 8B Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami Performance among Fishermen with Lost Boats
Current boat length
eighted to contr l for selection into the full sampl )
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Table 2.12: Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami Performance among Fishermen with
Lost Boats (weighted to control for selection into fishing)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES 1st stage IV
Log fishing revenue Current boat length Log fishing revenue
a: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) -0.102 -0.141** -0.112 -0.109*
(0.115) (0.0596) (0.114) (0.0610)
b: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2009 0.109 0.171* 0.129 0.127
(0.138) (0.0898) (0.133) (0.0899)
c: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2012 0.398** 0.281*** 0.431*** 0.168
(0.165) (0.108) (0.164) (0.111)
d: Pre-tsunami boat length 0.236*
(0.137)
e: Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2009 -0.125
(0.162)
f: Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2012 -0.0553
(0.153)
Boat aid (dummy) -3.780*** -3.605*** -0.871** -4.037*** 0.0996
(0.868) (0.833) (0.359) (0.902) (0.232)
g: Aid boat length 0.458** 0.442** 0.109** 0.538***
(0.197) (0.191) (0.0459) (0.114)
h: Aid boat length X Yr2009 0.221 0.215 0.0363
(0.171) (0.191) (0.0470)
i: Aid boat length X Yr2012 -0.0221 -0.0644 0.0347
(0.182) (0.179) (0.0483)
j: Current boat length(instrumented) 0.208**
(0.0817)
k: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2009 0.0840*
(0.0452)
l: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2012 0.0230
(0.101)
Constant 8.190*** 6.431*** 13.26*** 7.875*** 11.41***
(1.206) (1.388) (0.741) (0.812) (0.983)
Chi squared statistic of testing:
a = a+b =a+ c 3.16** - 3.93** - 1.55
d =d+e = d+f - 0.35 - - -
g =g+h = g+i 2.11 1.86 0.37 - -
j =j+k = j+l - - - - 1.88
Aid boat length (instrument) = 0 - - - 22.27*** -
Observations 202 208 199 202 199
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include sub-district (kecamantan), interview month, and year fixed effects.
Table 8C Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami Performance among Fishermen with Lost Boats
Current boat length
(weighted to control for selection into fishing)
55
Table 2.13: Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami Performance among Fishermen with
Lost Boats (weighted to control for selection into aid application)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES 1st stage IV
Log fishing revenue Current boat length Log fishing revenue
a: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) -0.0821 -0.114 -0.0827 -0.0923
(0.125) (0.0737) (0.127) (0.0761)
b: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2009 0.0645 0.147 0.0391 0.125
(0.145) (0.105) (0.152) (0.105)
c: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2012 0.254 0.265** 0.282 0.204*
(0.179) (0.118) (0.177) (0.120)
d: Pre-tsunami boat length 0.353**
(0.178)
e: Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2009 -0.178
(0.185)
f: Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2012 -0.105
(0.184)
Boat aid (dummy) -4.612*** -3.752*** -0.797** -4.604*** 0.0718
(0.773) (0.767) (0.331) (0.909) (0.220)
g: Aid boat length 0.650*** 0.551*** 0.0894** 0.633***
(0.144) (0.166) (0.0445) (0.108)
h: Aid boat length X Yr2009 0.104 0.115 0.0572
(0.124) (0.152) (0.0442)
i: Aid boat length X Yr2012 -0.141 -0.145 0.0390
(0.151) (0.157) (0.0486)
j: Current boat length(instrumented) 0.115*
(0.0693)
k: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2009 0.138**
(0.0623)
l: Current boat length(instrumented)* X Yr2012 0.0688
(0.0811)
Constant 6.872*** 4.497*** 13.44*** 6.909*** 12.40***
(0.877) (1.407) (0.764) (0.789) (0.925)
Chi squared statistic of testing:
a = a+b =a+ c 1.05 - 2.71* - 1.59
d =d+e = d+f - 0.52 - -
g =g+h = g+i 2.22 2.03 0.85 - 2.49*
j =j+k = j+l - - - - -
Aid boat length (instrument) = 0 - - - 34.67*** -
Observations 213 222 209 213 209
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include sub-district (kecamantan), interview month, and year fixed effects.
Table 8D Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami Performance among Fishermen with Lost Boats
Current boat length
(weighted to control for selection into aid application)
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Table 2.14: Impact of Boat Aid and Pre-Tsunami Boat Length on Current Boat Length
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
a: Pre-tsunami boat length 0.268** 0.270** 0.661*** 0.671***
(0.108) (0.111) (0.101) (0.0915)
b: Aid boat length 0.171** 0.170** 0.0875 0.0224
(0.0818) (0.0851) (0.0872) (0.0526)
Age 0.0275 0.0976
(0.0789) (0.406)
Age squared -0.000435 -0.000653
(0.000873) (0.00449)
Father was a fisherman -0.264 3.113*
(0.333) (1.775)
Constant 4.134*** 3.779** 1.240 -3.378
(0.655) (1.786) (0.903) (9.069)
Sub-district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistcs of testing:
a=1 45.87*** 43.62*** 11.23*** 12.91***
b=0 4.35** 4.01** 1.01 0.18
a=b 0.33 0.32 24.52*** 46.84***
Observations 250 241 44 44
R-squared 0.434 0.439 0.733 0.810
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Within the pooled sample, the sub-sample of fishermen with surviving boats are weighted to control for selection
into aid application. The sub-sample of fishermen with lost boats are unweighted (the weights are set to one).
Sample (survived boats)Sample (lost boats)
Current boat length
Table 9A Impact of Aid an  Pre-tsunami Boat Length on Current Boat Length
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Table 2.15: Impact of Boat Aid and Pre-Tsunami Boat Length on Current Boat Length
(sample with no aid boat is use)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
a: Pre-tsunami boat length 0.360*** 0.359*** 0.676*** 0.673***
(0.121) (0.123) (0.128) (0.120)
b: Aid boat length 0.157** 0.155* 0.0963 0.0231
(0.0793) (0.0823) (0.106) (0.0652)
Age 0.0116 0.0929
(0.0932) (0.422)
Age squared -0.000316 -0.000590
(0.00103) (0.00472)
Father was a fisherman -0.409 3.096*
(0.384) (1.814)
Constant 3.672*** 3.814* 1.125 -3.314
(0.718) (2.110) (1.122) (9.225)
Sub-district FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-statistcs of testing:
a=1 27.85*** 27.02*** 6.35** 7.38**
b=0 3.93** 3.56* 0.83 0.12
a=b 1.28 1.21 25.38*** 39.26***
Observations 199 193 42 42
R-squared 0.415 0.423 0.721 0.784
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Within the pooled sample, the sub-sample of fishermen with surviving boats are weighted to control for selection
into aid application. The sub-sample of fishermen with lost boats are unweighted (the weights are set to one).
Table 9B Impact of Aid and Pre-tsunami Boat Length on Current Boat Length
Sample (lost boats) Sample (survived boats)
Current boat length
(sample with no aid boat in use)
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2.6 Appendix A
This model closely follows the one in de Mel et al. (2008) but also draws on
Fafchamps et al. (2014). The key assumption is that fishermen are endowed with
heterogeneous fishing ability, θj. Consider the absence of aid boats. Taking initial
levels of capital, kj,1, asset, bj,1, and interest rates, {it}∞t=1, as given, fisherman j’s





cj,t + kj,t+1 + bj,t+1 ≤ f(kj,t, θj) + kj,t + (1 + it)bj,t (2.13)
where f(kj,t, θj) is the production function of fishing. First-order conditions with
respect to consumption, cj,t, capital, kj,t+1, and asset, bj,t+1, are:
λt = u
′(cj,t) (2.14)
λt = βλt+1[1 + ∂f(kj,t+1, θj)/∂kj,t+1] (2.15)
λt = βλt+1(1 + it+1) (2.16)
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Thus, equations (2.15) and (2.16) imply
∂f(kj,t+1, θj)/∂kj,t+1 = it+1 (2.17)
That is, at the the optimum, fisherman j sets the net return to investment to zero
such that the marginal revenue of capital is equal to the market interest rate of
asset.
Let the production function of fishing assume the Cobb-Douglas functional
form with constant returns to scale:





Here, the parameter α ∈ (0, 1) represents the share of capital in fishing. Let k∗j,t
denote the optimal level of capital for fisherman j. Equations (2.18) and (2.19)








Hence, the optimal level of capital is increasing in inherent fisherman ability, θj, and
the output elasticity of capital, α, but decreasing in the interest rate, it. Equations
(2.18) and (2.19) show that at the optimum, inherent fishing ability, θj, has a direct
impact on the production function as well as an indirect effect through the capital
stock.
Next, consider the presence of boat aid in post-tsunami Aceh. Let t be the
period when aid boats are distributed. If fisherman j receives an aid boat, then
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kj,t = kaid. His production function becomes:





Since kaid is exogenous, inherent fishing ability, θj, now only has a direct impact on
the production function. Thus, I can empirically separate the effect of capital on
fishing production from the effect of inherent fishing ability. In Section 2.4, I present
empirical evidence that while returns to aid boats, whose quality I measure with
boat length, and inherent fishing ability are both positive, the former diminishes over
time, i.e. ∂2f(kj,t, θj)/∂k
2








Table 2.16: Descriptive Statistics among Attrited and Non-Attrited Sample
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES A: Sample (Stayers) B: Sample (Attrited) A-B
Pre-tsunami characteristics:
Productivity (residuals) -0.0233 0.460 -0.483
(0.0908) (0.390) (0.413)
Boat length 8.920 8.726 0.194
(0.214) (0.268) (0.359)
Indebted 0.332 0.257 0.0754*
(0.0247) (0.0328) (0.0421)
Age 41.55 41.253 0.297
(0.577) (0.806) (1.000)
Household size 3.942 4.782 -0.840***
(0.0939) (0.132) (0.163)
No school 0.0444 0.0411 0.00328
(0.0112) (0.0165) (0.0202)
Elementary 0.537 0.479 0.0572
(0.0288) (0.0415) (0.0505)
Junior high school 0.217 0.295 -0.0779*
(0.0238) (0.0379) (0.0432)
Senior high school or above 0.163 0.185 -0.0216
(0.0214) (0.0322) (0.0380)
Father was a fisherman 0.0567 0.00685 0.0498**
(0.0134) (0.00685) (0.0198)
Wife attends arisan meetings 0.242 0.218 0.0239
(0.0225) (0.0309) (0.0387)
Number of income earners 1.571 1.559 0.0128
(0.0524) (0.0668) (0.0882)
Observations 363 179 -
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A1 Descriptive Statistics among Attrited and Non-Attrited Sample
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Table 2.17: Testing the Equality of Coefficients: Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami
Performance (pooled sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
Log of revenue Log of revenue
Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) -0.0415 -0.0756 0.772 0.0315
(0.0708) (0.0506) (0.798) (0.118)
Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2009 -0.0515 0.0829 -0.524 -0.202
(0.124) (0.0763) (1.004) (0.192)
Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2012 0.186 0.110 -0.730 -0.0846
(0.124) (0.0781) (0.967) (0.203)
Pre-tsunami boat length 0.361*** 0.569***
(0.137) (0.198)
Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2009 -0.148 0.0260
(0.159) (0.203)
Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2012 0.0579 -0.0738
(0.203) (0.209)
Boat aid (dummy) -5.622*** -3.920*** -1.278*** -4.600*** -4.312*** -0.850*
(0.709) (0.659) (0.266) (1.760) (1.102) (0.434)
Aid boat length 0.768*** 0.643*** 0.155*** 0.568** 0.429** 0.0738
(0.119) (0.125) (0.0408) (0.264) (0.194) (0.0627)
Aid boat length X Yr2009 -0.0406 0.0913 -0.0211 -0.0570 -0.112 0.0265
(0.117) (0.146) (0.0372) (0.171) (0.171) (0.0459)
Aid boat length X Yr2012 -0.205 -0.221 -0.00519 -0.0951 -0.00692 0.0186
(0.128) (0.158) (0.0452) (0.189) (0.182) (0.0595)
Constant 6.498*** 2.810** 14.14*** 6.498*** 2.810** 14.14***
(1.066) (1.174) (0.357) (1.066) (1.174) (0.357)
Hypothesis (coefficients are equal between sample):
Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) 1.08 0.68 1.08 0.68
Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2009 0.21 1.87 0.21 1.87
Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2012 0.91 0.84 0.91 0.84
Pre-tsunami boat length 1.32 1.32
Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2009 0.73 0.73
Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2012 0.37 0.37
Boat aid (dummy) 0.41 0.13 1.17 0.41 0.13 1.17
Aid boat length 0.79 0.85 1.85 0.79 0.85 1.85
Aid boat length X Yr2009 0.02 0.71 1.41 0.02 0.71 1.41
Aid boat length X Yr2012 0.68 0.69 0.27 0.68 0.69 0.27
Observations 354 589 352 354 589 352
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include sub-district (kecamantan), interview month, and year fixed effects.
The model is estimated on the pooled sample. Coefficients are reported separately for each sample. Within the pooled sample, the sub-sample of fishermen with surviving boats
are weighted by inverse probability weights that control for selection into aid application. The sub-sample of fishermen with lost boats are unweighted (the weights are set to one).
Sample (lost boats) Sample (survived boats)
Current boat length Current boat length
Table A2 Testing the Equality of Coefficients: Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami Performance (pooled sample)
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Table 2.18: Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami Performance (pooled sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES 1st stage IV
Log fishing revenue Current boat length Log fishing revenue
a: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) -0.0718 -0.0422 -0.0995 -0.0205
(0.156) (0.0468) (0.165) (0.0477)
b: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2009 0.0471 -0.0127 0.0749 -0.0384
(0.212) (0.0738) (0.236) (0.0743)
c: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2012 0.120 0.0553 0.210 0.00968
(0.219) (0.0749) (0.238) (0.0752)
d: Pre-tsunami boat length 0.341**
(0.160)
e: Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2009 0.0277
(0.186)
f: Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2012 0.0914
(0.183)
Boat aid (dummy) -5.836*** -5.216*** -1.125*** -5.569*** -0.00212
(0.832) (0.699) (0.270) (0.898) (0.177)
g: Aid boat length 0.803*** 0.718*** 0.128*** 0.637***
(0.115) (0.101) (0.0382) (0.102)
h: Aid boat length X Yr2009 -0.142 -0.149 0.000624
(0.138) (0.117) (0.0344)
i: Aid boat length X Yr2012 -0.273* -0.256** 0.00349
(0.144) (0.116) (0.0432)
j: Current boat length(instrumented) 0.121
(0.0748)
k: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2009 0.119*
(0.0682)
l: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2012 0.0647
(0.0802)
Constant 4.772*** 2.972** 14.19*** 4.915*** 13.58***
(1.362) (1.507) (0.319) (1.496) (0.475)
Chi squared statistic of testing:
a = a+b =a+ c 0.16 - 0.39 0.20
d =d+e = d+f - 0.18 - - -
g =g+h = g+i 1.81 2.43* 0.00 - -
j =j+k = j+l - - - - 1.59
Aid boat length (instrument) = 0 - - - 39.08*** -
Observations 397 633 358 397 358
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include sub-district (kecamantan), interview month, and year fixed effects.
Within the pooled sample, the sub-sample of fishermen with surviving boats are weighted by inverse probability weights that control for selection
into aid application. The sub-sample of fishermen with lost boats are unweighted (the weights are set to one).
Table A3 Impact of Boat Aid  Post-Tsunami Performance (Pooled Sample)
Current boat length
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Table 2.19: Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami Performance among Fishermen with
Lost Boats using CES Productivity Measure (unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 1st stage IV
Current boat length Log fishing revenue Current boat length Log fishing revenue
a: Pre-tsunami CES productivity (residuals) -0.0793 -0.0800* -0.0855 -0.0604
(0.0654) (0.0457) (0.0685) (0.0456)
b: Pre-tsunami CES  productivity (residuals) X Yr2009 0.0883 0.115 0.0865 0.0915
(0.0947) (0.0711) (0.105) (0.0697)
c: Pre-tsunami CES productivity (residuals) X Yr2012 0.249** 0.131** 0.281** 0.0709
(0.0993) (0.0664) (0.115) (0.0680)
Boat aid (dummy) -4.968*** -1.101*** -4.919*** -0.0199
(0.775) (0.335) (0.747) (0.220)
g: Aid boat length 0.692*** 0.126*** 0.646***
(0.126) (0.0423) (0.0769)
h: Aid boat length X Yr2009 0.103 0.0453
(0.107) (0.0424)
i: Aid boat length X Yr2012 -0.219* 0.00830
(0.128) (0.0466)
j: Current boat length(instrumented) 0.171**
(0.0687)
k: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2009 0.102*
(0.0604)
l: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2012 0.0358
(0.0774)
Constant 11.70*** 14.29*** 11.60*** 12.04***
(0.799) (0.620) (0.771) (0.734)
Chi squared statistic of testing:
a = a+b =a+ c 6.28** 4.99* - 2.11
g =g+h = g+i 5.86* 1.67 - -
j =j+k = j+l - - - 3.54
Aid boat length (instrument) = 0 - - 70.48*** -
Observations 264 262 264 262
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include sub-district (kecamantan), interview month, and year fixed effects.
Table A4 Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami Performance among Fisher en with Lost Boats
using C  Productivity Measure ( nweighted)
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Table 2.20: Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami Performance among Fishermen with
Lost Boats using Per Unit Productivity Measure (unweighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 1st stage IV
Current boat length Log fishing revenue Current boat length Log fishing revenue
a: Pre-tsunami per unit productivity (residuals) -0.0867 -0.0760* -0.0927 -0.0552
(0.0693) (0.0457) (0.0720) (0.0457)
b: Pre-tsunami per unit  productivity (residuals) X Yr2009 0.0912 0.111 0.0871 0.0867
(0.0949) (0.0705) (0.105) (0.0694)
c: Pre-tsunami per unit productivity (residuals) X Yr2012 0.253** 0.128* 0.285** 0.0678
(0.0998) (0.0664) (0.115) (0.0680)
Boat aid (dummy) -4.969*** -1.101*** -4.922*** -0.0180
(0.776) (0.335) (0.747) (0.220)
g: Aid boat length 0.692*** 0.126*** 0.646***
(0.126) (0.0424) (0.0770)
h: Aid boat length X Yr2009 0.103 0.0452
(0.107) (0.0426)
i: Aid boat length X Yr2012 -0.219* 0.00809
(0.128) (0.0467)
j: Current boat length(instrumented) 0.172**
(0.0690)
k: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2009 0.102*
(0.0610)
l: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2012 0.0352
(0.0777)
Constant 11.70*** 14.29*** 11.60*** 12.04***
(0.800) (0.618) (0.772) (0.735)
Chi squared statistic of testing:
a = a+b =a+ c 6.44** 4.78* - 1.93
g =g+h = g+i 5.85* 1.65 - -
j =j+k = j+l - - - 3.49
Aid boat length (instrument) = 0 - - 70.37*** -
Observations 264 262 264 262
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include sub-district (kecamantan), interview month, and year fixed effects.
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Table 2.21: Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami Performance among Fishermen with
Lost Boats (in Kecamantan with <100% Aid)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES 1st stage IV
Log fishing revenue Current boat length Log fishing revenue
a: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) -0.115 -0.114 -0.132 -0.0794
(0.111) (0.0736) (0.117) (0.0755)
b: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2009 0.153 0.196** 0.156 0.147
(0.147) (0.0969) (0.162) (0.0983)
c: Pre-tsunami productivity (residuals) X Yr2012 0.324** 0.275*** 0.362** 0.195*
(0.161) (0.101) (0.180) (0.108)
d: Pre-tsunami boat length 0.272**
(0.137)
e: Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2009 -0.0715
(0.0927)
f: Pre-tsunami boat length X Yr2012 0.0182
(0.132)
Boat aid (dummy) -5.118*** -4.830*** -1.007*** -5.127*** 0.0342
(0.835) (0.741) (0.356) (0.811) (0.226)
g: Aid boat length 0.687*** 0.629*** 0.114** 0.663***
(0.133) (0.126) (0.0444) (0.0870)
h: Aid boat length X Yr2009 0.102 0.104 0.0465
(0.110) (0.115) (0.0437)
i: Aid boat length X Yr2012 -0.167 -0.164 0.0187
(0.134) (0.132) (0.0499)
j: Current boat length(instrumented) 0.162**
(0.0706)
k: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2009 0.0928
(0.0607)
l: Current boat length(instrumented) X Yr2012 0.0268
(0.0836)
Constant 10.34*** 8.754*** 13.86*** 10.40*** 11.95***
(1.157) (1.613) (0.517) (1.036) (0.583)
Chi squared statistic of testing:
a = a+b =a+ c 4.12 - 9.24*** - 4.11
d =d+e = d+f - 0.95 - - -
g =g+h = g+i 3.47 3.86 1.29 - -
j =j+k = j+l - - - - 2.93
Aid boat length (instrument) = 0 - - - 57.98*** -
Observations 215 343 216 215 216
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include sub-district (kecamantan), interview month, and year fixed effects.
Table A5 Impact of Boat Aid on Post-Tsunami Perform ce among Fishermen with Lost Boats (without 100% Aid Kecamantan)
Current boat length
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Chapter 3: Household Responses to Natural Disasters:
Labor Supply and Borrowing
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I explore the differences in behavior among Indonesian house-
holds before and after exposure to natural hazards. I focus on the following out-
come variables of interest: market labor, voluntary labor, household-level borrowing
through formal sources, and individual-level borrowing through informal sources. In
addition, I examine whether there are gender differences in the changes of these out-
comes. Specifically, by using household panel data from Indonesia in 1997, 2000,
and 2007, I analyze the short-run (one year) weeks of work and borrowing responses
to different types of natural hazards, including storms, floods, landslides, and earth-
quakes.
The focus on labor outcomes is related to the literature that examine the
relationship among adult labor supply, wages, and income shocks. Kochar (1999),
for example, explores the increase from farm to off-farm hours of work by Indian
households after they experience household-specific shocks to crop income. Similarly,
Rose (2001) demonstrates that Indian farm households are more likely to participate
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in the labor market in the aftermath of unexpected and negative rainfall shocks.
Since natural hazards are locally aggregate shocks, a shift of labor from farm to
off-farm activities would not alleviate the shock for households. Thus, instead of
comparing labor supplied on-farm and off-farm, I focus on the specific intensive
margin of wage labor by analyzing the quantity of paid labor supplied on the market
among male and female household members in Indonesia.
More generally, this chapter contributes to the existing literature that study
the determinants of occupational choice and labor supply. From a theoretical per-
spective, Banerjee and Newman (1993) build a model in which the the structure
of occupational choice is determined by the initial distribution of wealth, but the
process of development has an impact on this structure by changing the demand for
and supply of different types and thus returns to labor and occupations.
Empirically, Bardhan (1979) is one of the first studies that uses micro-level
data to estimate labor supply functions among agricultural households in a devel-
oping country context. By predicting the wage rate with a hypothetical minimum
that is exogenously determined, Bardhan (1979) finds that the wage elasticity of
supply is small. Instead, the author finds that labor supply, measured by the agri-
cultural labor days supplied in a reference week, is more strongly determined by
social and demographic conditions of the household. A limitation of this study is
the use of cross-sectional data as it does not control for unobserved heterogeneity
among households.
To identify the causal impacts of extreme weather events on household labor
and borrowing in Indonesia, I first estimate the predicted number of hazards in each
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of the 216 districts (kabupaten) in each survey year using historical data from 1980 to
2008. I then take the residuals from these regressions as the unexpected number of
hazards. Since changes in wage rates reflect shifts in both the demand and supply of
labor, an OLS estimation of labor supply elasticities is likely to be biased downward
(Oettinger 1999). Therefore, I account for the endogeneity of wages by using the
sector-year-province average wage by gender to instrument for self-reported wages.
In contrast to the finding in Gagnon (2013) that wage labor supply in Hon-
duras is not statistically different between municipalities with and without exposure
to Hurricane Mitch in the short run, I find that women from districts with more
unexpected disasters work 3% to 8% fewer weeks on the market, depending on the
specification. However, I find no evidence of disaster-related changes in male la-
bor supply. Unexpected disasters are also associated with higher probabilities of
household-level borrowing and participation in rotating community credit groups,
as well as larger loans.
The finding that women in districts with more unexpected disasters work fewer
weeks as paid labor combined with the associated higher likelihood of borrowing and
higher values of loan suggest that the substitution effect dominates the income effect.
Consistent with the discussion in Jayachandran (2006), when labor productivity is
low, adverse weather shocks may reduce the demand for agricultural labor, leading
to a reduction in wages and labor supplied if households can borrow or smooth
consumption by drawing on their savings.
The result that the male and female labor supply responses to natural hazards
differ is consistent with the work done by Rosenzweig (1978) and Heckman (1993)
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showing that in developing countries, women face additional institutional constraints
on their ability to adjust their labor supply on the market. Moreover, the focus
on individual-level borrowing through informal sources is related to the literature
that looks at the presence of risk-pooling among households as a coping mechanism
against adverse shocks. Udry (1994), for example, shows that the realized rates of
return are lower and the repayment periods are longer for Nigerian households that
experience negative income shocks. This finding of state-contingent loans suggest
that households do not only rely on ex-ante consumption-smoothing mechanisms
such as saving, but also ex-post mechanisms to counter income fluctuations due to
unexpected shocks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents a theoreti-
cal framework linking household behavior and natural hazards. Section 3.3 describes
the household and disaster data. Section 3.4 presents the empirical strategy and Sec-
tion 3.5 discusses the results. Section 3.6 concludes and discusses extensions of this
study.
3.2 Theory
In this section, I briefly outline the theoretic channels linking natural hazards
with each of the three outcomes of interest. First, natural disasters may affect
household supply of labor on the market in various ways and the overall direction
of the impact is ambiguous. If a natural disaster kills or injures a portion of the
labor force, aggregate labor supply may fall and the wage increases, leading to an
71
increase in household labor supply if the substitution effect dominates the income
effect. Moreover, if a natural disaster causes physical damage to infrastructure
that needs rebuilding, aggregate labor demand would increase and the wage also
increases. However, if a natural disaster disrupts the transportation network such
that the costs for certain households to get to work increase, household labor supply
may be constrained to a sub-optimal level.
Within the same household, these possible links between natural hazards and
labor supply may differ among men and women. For instance, the increase in wages
due to a construction boom to rebuild damaged infrastructure is more likely to im-
pact men because of higher demand for male labor in physically-demanding work.
Meanwhile, women are more likely to contribute to the social aspects of recon-
struction, such as childcare, household maintenance, and care of the elderly, due
to existing social norms about their roles in society (Trohanis, Svetlosakova, and
Carlsson-Rex 2011). Moreover, since women assume these traditional roles of care
taking and securing household assets, they are more vulnerable to disasters because
they tend to spend more time in their homes, which are often constructed from
materials that do not withstand destruction from disasters. Appendix C presents
a theoretical model that relates natural disasters with individual labor supply deci-
sions under the assumption that these social norms are binding.
The second theoretical channel relates household borrowing and natural haz-
ards. When households are hit by locally aggregate shocks such as natural hazards,
the role of informal insurance may weaken because the majority of members within
such networks are impacted simultaneously. Thus, households may resort to bor-
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row through formal sources such as financial institutions and government borrowing
programs, in addition to relying on unaffected neighbors. This chapter extends the
work of Zylberberg (2010) and Czura and Klonner (2012) by distinguishing between
the impact of natural hazards on household borrowing and individual participation
in arisan meetings, a rotating credit group at the community level.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Household Data
I use household data from the second, third and forth waves of the Indonesian
Family Life survey (IFLS), collected in 1997, 2000 and in 2007, respectively. The first
wave of the IFLS, conducted in 1993, is a socioeconomic and health survey based
on a sample of households representing about 83% of the Indonesian population
living in 13 of the nation’s 26 provinces (Frankenberg and Karoly 1995). In 1997,
IFLS2 relocated and reinterviewed 94% of IFLS1 households. In cases where survey
respondents moved in the intervening years, interviews were conducted at the new
locations provided that they lay within the 13 provinces enumerated in the first wave
of the Survey. IFLS3 and IFLS4 have 95.3% and 93.6% of reinterview rates with
IFLS1 households respectively. Among other topics, the Survey gathered data on
community resources, individual demographics, adult and children characteristics,
as well as household economy, including expenditures, labor and non-labor income,
asset ownership, and borrowing.
For adult labor outcomes, all respondents above 15 years of age are asked to
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identify a primary job and, if applicable, a secondary job. Information about the
nature of the job, sector of work, hours and weeks of work, as well as monthly and
annual salary are available. There are three categories describing the nature of the
job - self-employed, unpaid family worker, and working for government agencies or
private companies. According to the definition of labor force characteristics from
the Current Population Survey conducted by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, the
labor force is the sum of employed and unemployed persons. The former consists
of persons who ”do any work for pay or profit during a reference period; persons
who did at least 15 hours of unpaid work per week in a family-operated enterprise,
and persons who were temporarily absent from their regular jobs because of illness,
vacation, bad weather, industrial dispute, or various personal reasons” (BLS 2013).
Thus, I define an individual to be a participant in the labor force as long as she
reports working for profit as a self-employed person or for wage or as an unpaid
family worker with 15 or more hours of work per week.
In this chapter, I categorize labor force participation into three groups. The
first group is market labor, for which I define as weeks worked as paid labor for
the government, private companies, or self-employed persons for profit in non-
agricultural businesses. The second group is domestic labor, for which I define as
weeks worked as self-employed persons for profit in agricultural businesses or unpaid
weeks worked for agricultural family businesses. The third group is other unpaid
labor, for which I include uncompensated weeks worked for non-agricultural family
businesses. In addition to formal labor, the Survey asks if respondents participate
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in various community groups in the past year, including voluntary labor1 .
In terms of household financing options, the Survey collects information on par-
ticipation in borrowing through various sources, including rotating credit schemes
called arisan in Indonesia. Arisan is a group lottery conducted at periodic meetings,
in which each member contributes a certain amount of money to a common pool
given to the tenured member whose name is drawn at random. Table 3.1 lists all the
sources of borrowing and percentages of households who borrow from these sources.
Various purposes are reported for obtaining loans, including social ceremonies, per-
sonal expenses such as medication, education, as well as business expenses including
the purchase of inputs, equipment, land and cattle.
3.3.2 Summary Statistics
I aggregate individual-level data to form an unbalanced2 three-year panel,
yielding samples of 15,218 adult respondents from 6,716 households in 1997, 16,950
respondents from 8,653 households in 2000 and 21,220 respondents from 10,991
households in 2007.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present descriptive statistics of the household sample. In
terms of household composition and demographics, there are 48% men and 51%
women, on average, in all three waves of the IFLS. Of these adults, over 60% are
1A detailed description of “voluntary labor” is not provided in the questionnaire. Instead, an
example of voluntary labor cited is ”cleaning up the village.” Thus, I believe ”voluntary labor” is
a broad category that refers to any kind of labor that is unpaid, voluntary, and generally benefit
the village.
2Analysis using a balance panel provides consistent results with that of an unbalanced panel.
Since unbalanced households provide additional information and variation to the analysis, I present
results from the unbalanced panel in the chapter.
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married at the time of the survey and over 40% report having children residing in the
household. In the analysis on labor outcomes, I restrict the sample to households
with working age (15 to 65 years) adults. In these households, women are slightly
older than men, with the average age at 33 for both gender. Men are more educated
than women on average, with under 10% with no schooling, over 30% attended at
most primary school, over 45% attended at most secondary school, and close to 10%
of men attended university. By contrast, over 10% of women never attended school,
over 30% attended at most primary school, under 45% attended at most secondary
school, and under 8% attended university.
In terms of household economy, the 1997 data reflect the economic downturn
due to the financial crisis, while the 2000 and 2007 data imply the trends of recovery.
Non-labor income from the sale and rent revenue of assets average 2.79 million
Rupiah3 in 1997, 4.52 million Rupiah in 2000, and 3.83 million Rupiah in 2007. For
household, farm and non-farm business assets, the lowest market values appear in
1997 and the highest values in 2000.
In terms of labor outcomes, participation in paid market work increases over
time but the gender gap remains. While 32%, 40%, and 44% of women report
positive weeks worked as paid market labor in the three respective survey years,
58%, 67%, and 68% of men do. In terms of work sectors, a third of the sample
engages in agricultural work.
Conditional on participation as paid market labor, men work slightly more
3All monetary values are in real 2007 Rupiah. The current (December, 2013) exchange rate of
Rupiah to US dollars is 1 IDR = 0.000082 USD.
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yearly weeks than women on average. While women work 38.38, 35.28, and 40.21
weeks in 1997, 2000, and 2007; men work 39.52, 36.04, and 40.87 weeks. However,
men earn a much higher weekly wage on average. Female weekly wage is 0.093 million
Rupiah in 1997, representing only 66% of the male weekly wage at 0.14 million
Rupiah. In subsequent years, the ratio of female to male weekly wage increases but
never surpasses 70%. Female weekly wages are on average 52% and 68% of the male
wages in 2000 and 2007, respectively.
The gender gap in labor force participation extends to the case of voluntary
labor. While 81% of men report participating in voluntary labor in the year prior
to the survey, ply 29% of women did in 1997. Participation in voluntary labor
decreased in 2000, with 68% and 19% of male and female volunteers. Although
voluntary work increased again in 2007, levels are still lower than in 1997, with 72%
of male and 21% of female volunteers.
In terms of household finance, the extensive margin in household borrowing
has decreased over time during the study period, from 38% in 1997, to 23% in 2000,
and 18% in 2007. However, for households who borrow, the average amount of loan
in real 2009 Rupiah has risen more than twofold from 3.745 million Rupiah in 1997,
to 5.832 million Rupiah in 2000, and 9.470 million Rupiah in 2007. The size of these
loans constitute 6%, 7%, and 12% of the market value of household assets in the
respective years.
A similar trend appears in individual participation in arisan, a periodic and
rotating credit group based on lottery. On average, there are 20 such meetings in
a year across the survey years. A wide gender gap in both the participation and
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amount of monetary contribution exists throughout the study period. In 1997, 17%
of male respondents attended at least one arisan meeting, while 38% of women did
on average. Only 16% and 11% of men attended arisan in 2000 and 2007, while
39% and 32% of women did in the respective waves. Among those who participate
in arisan, the average amount of money contributed at each meeting is similar
across men and women. Male participants contribute 3.66 Rupiah on average in
1997 while female participants contribute 3.03 Rupiah. These amounts constitute
roughly 31% and 42% of their weekly labor income. In subsequent survey years, the
amount contributed increased at a rate of approximately 50%, with men contributing
5.34 and 7.7 Rupiah in 2000 and 2007, representing 13% and 32% of weekly labor
income. Similarly, women contribute 4.99 and 7.67 Rupiah in the respective years,
representing 22% and 47% of weekly labor income.
3.3.3 Disaster Data
Using data from the Indonesian National Board for Disaster Management
(BNPB), I show in Figure 3.1 the distribution of natural hazards from 1900 to 2008
across districts by the number of events. I only include districts that are IFLS enu-
meration areas. Although the figure shows that the distribution of disaster events is
non-random, there is variation in the degree of exposure to natural hazards among
nearby IFLS regions. To control for this variation, I include district-level fixed effects
in the empirical estimation (see Section 3.4 below).
To measure household exposure to natural hazards, I match the IFLS house-
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hold data with the BNPB disaster data. I restrict the estimation sample to include
only recorded natural hazards from 1980 to 2008. In addition, I exclude tsunamis
and volcanic eruptions from the analysis due to their low-probability of occurrence.
I also exclude forest fires because they are often non-random events that are caused,
in part, by human activities. Finally, I exclude droughts because these events typi-
cally last a long period of time and it is difficult to estimate their causal impacts on
individual- or household-level outcomes measured at specific, and often short, time
intervals. Types of disasters that remain are earthquakes, floods, landslides, storms,
and surges.
During this period, 1,106 events of these types have occurred in 216 districts.
For each recorded event, the BNPB data also contain measures of vulnerability to
disasters, such as the number of people dead, missing, injured, affected, and evacu-
ated due to each natural hazard. Using this information, I construct a vulnerability
index for each event by calculating the proportion of the district population who is
affected by each of the categories.
3.3.4 Identification Strategy
In this study, the interview date and district of residence jointly determine a
household’s exposure to natural disasters. Table 3.4 shows the exposure of IFLS
households and districts to these natural hazards in each of the survey years. The
numbers demonstrate the limitations in using level shocks. First, the number of
recorded events has increased significantly between 1997 to 2007 due to improve-
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ments in disaster detection and monitoring technology. Thus, the absolute number
of realized events is a poor measurement of shock without taking into account the
reporting bias.
In addition, empirical evidence from studies of property prices before and
after natural disasters suggests that economic agents update their risk perceptions
based on past experience of extreme weather outcomes (see e.g. Brookshire et al.
1985, Bin and Polasky 2004, Hallstrom and Smith 2005). Therefore, the impact of
level shocks on household behavior ex-post may be biased due to possible ex-ante
disaster-mitigating behavior for agents who form expectations of future outcomes.
Informative rainfall forecasts, for example, may lead to anticipatory migration that
is welfare-improving (Rosenzweig and Udry 2014).
Instead of level measures of disasters, I propose a two-step procedure to isolate
the unanticipated portion of disaster shock. I exploit the historic nature of the
BNPB disaster data and predict the number of disasters in each district in each
year as a first step:
Dkt = β0 + β1Dk(t−1) + θt + γk + νkt (3.1)
In the baseline specification, Dkt is the total number of disasters that hit
district k in year t where t = 1980, 1980, ..., 2008. θt and γk are year and district
fixed effects. Column (1) of Table 3.5 shows the results of this estimation, with
the one-year lagged total number of disasters being positively correlated with the
realized number of disasters in the current year (statistically significant at the 1%
level). Since the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator for dynamic panel
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data models is not consistent for finite T (length of the longitudinal component of
the panel), I use Kiviet (1995)’s approximation to correct the bias. As Column (2)
shows, the magnitude of the coefficient on the lagged total number of disasters is
45% larger with the Kiviet correction. In the second step, I regress individual and
household outcomes on the resulting error terms, νkt, which capture the unexpected
number of disasters for each household in each survey year.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
The central hypothesis of this chapter is that households change their behavior
in response to natural hazards, including adjustments in labor supply, borrowing,
and participation in arisan. I test this hypothesis empirically by comparing out-
comes among households in districts with and without natural disasters.
3.4.1 Labor Outcomes
For labor market outcomes, I restrict the sample to men and women in joint-
households with adult members who are of working age (between 15 and 65). Since
the theoretical model in Appendix C suggests that natural disasters have no impacts
on neither the slope nor the elasticity of male labor supply, male household members
function as controls in the following analysis.
Market Labor Supply
To account for bias in the labor supply equations due to endogenous wages, I
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include several instruments. First, I include dummy variables for each household’s
main ethnic influence (28 dummies). Second, I estimate the male and female sector-
year-province-average wages to control for sector-year-province-specific shocks in
wages. Since this instrument varies at the province level, it captures variation in
local wages due to variation in exposure and vulnerability to natural disasters. The











































where w̄fspt denotes the identifying instrument - the sector-year-province-average
wage for females - and w̄mspt represents the equivalent for males. The parametric









































5Xkt + θt +σh +µ
m
iht (3.5)
Here, weeksit denotes the total number of weeks worked by individual i in household
h at time t (where t = 1997, 2000, 2007). l̂ogwiht denotes the log of predicted weekly
wage using instruments described above. The coefficient α1 represents the strengths
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of substitution and income effects for market labor supply. A positive α1 suggests a
domination of the substitution effect over the income effect, and vice versa. Xfit are
control variables for female respondents, including her age, the squared of her age,
her education, a dummy variable indicating whether she works in the agricultural
sector, and her marital status . Xmit is a vector of controls for her male partner
who lives in the same household, including his wage, age, and education. If a
woman lives with more than one man, then these variables are averaged over the
total number of male household members. Xht is a vector of variables on household
characteristics, including non-labor income, number of children under five, number
of children between the ages of six and 14, and total number of adult household
members. Xkt is a vector of district-level variables, including dummies of whether
the district is urban and coastal. I include time fixed-effects, θt, and household fixed
effects, σh. The error terms u
f and um are clustered at the household level.4
To test the hypothesis that individual market labor supply before and after






























1 Dhkt + δ
m













4 Xht + α
m




4As a robustness check, I also estimate the same equations with the error terms clustered at
the district (kabupaten) level.
5In this and subsequent sections, when individual-level equations are specified, only the female
equation with the superscript f is presented. The equivalent equation for men with the superscript
m is also estimated.
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where Dhkt is a vector of residuals from equation (3.1), representing the unpredicted
number of disasters within a year of the interview date of household h in region k at
time t. Since the IFLS interviews households over a period of several months in each
survey year, I control for the time of interview in constructing D. If household h is
interviewed anytime between July and December of year t, Dkt is assigned to this
household; while Dk(t−1) is assigned to households who are interviewed sometime be-
tween January and June of year t. Thus, households that reside in the same district
may have different levels of exposure to disasters due to their specific interview dates
within the survey period. V is a vector of vulnerability measures, including the av-
erage proportion of the population dead, missing, affected, injured, and evacuated in
region k at time t across all disasters within one year of household h’s interview date.
Volunteer Labor
In addition to market labor, I also examine the extent to which participation























where volunteerfit is a dummy which equals one if woman i participated in volunteer
labor in year t. I also estimate the equivalent model separately for men. A positive
b1 suggests that women in regions with more unpredicted natural disasters are more
likely to participate in volunteer labor.
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3.4.2 Borrowing
Besides labor outcomes, I examine whether households resort to borrow from
formal sources and participate in rotating credit groups in the community to fi-
nance and cope with negative income shocks due to natural disasters. To examine






Here, Borrowht is a dummy variable that equals one if household h has borrowed
money in year t. Iht denotes a vector of variables describing the household com-
position and demographics. Those variables include the number of adult members,
children under five, and children between the ages of six and fifteen; a set of ed-
ucation dummies describing the highest level of education attended, including no
schooling, primary education, secondary education, adult education, and college ed-
ucation, as well as the level and squared of the average age among adult members in
the household. Financeht is a vector of monetary variables describing the financial
portfolio of the household, including non-labor income, as well as the market values
of household assets, farm business assets, and non-farm business assets.
Further, I specify the household demand for credit through borrowing in the
6Information on individual borrowing is unavailable in the IFLS data, therefore, I conduct the








where logloanht represents the amount borrowed by household h in year t in log
form.
3.4.3 Participation in Arisan
To examine changes in the participation of arisan groups due to natural dis-




















where arisanit is a dummy variable that equals one if individual i participated in
at least one arisan meeting in year t. Lht is a vector of dummy variables that equal
one if the household has at least one female member who works as a paid market
worker, paid domestic worker, or an unpaid family worker.
I also specify the supply of arisan credit equation as follows:

















where arisan contributionit represents the total amount contributed by individual




Table 3.6 presents the results of the estimation of equation (3.6) in which I
estimate the impact of natural disasters on annual weeks worked as paid market
labor. The estimation sample consists of women who participate in the labor force
as paid workers in non-agricultural sectors in all survey years. Since self-reported
wages is endogenous in an estimation with the weeks worked in a year as the depen-
dent variable, I use the sector-year-province average female wage as the identifying
instrument for reported wages. Columns (1), (3) and (5) show the first stage esti-
mations. In all models, F-tests show that the identifying instrument is strong and
statistically significant at the 1% level.
Column (2) shows the results of an estimation of equation (3.6) that includes
both the realized number of disasters in a district per survey year and the unex-
pected number, measured by the residuals of equation (3.1). Due to possible ex-ante
disaster-mitigating behavior for agents who form expectations of future outcomes,
the impact of level shocks on household behavior ex-post may be biased. Thus, the
unexpected number of disasters represents plausibly exogenous disaster shocks. I
find that while the realized number of disasters has a statistically zero impact on the
number of weeks worked on the market by female household members, women in dis-
tricts with an additional unexpected disaster work 8% fewer weeks year (significant
at the 5% level). This result lends support to the notion that rational economic
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agents form expectations about weather outcomes and the unexpected outcomes,
which are plausibly exogenous, lead to behavioral changes such as labor supplied on
the market.
Column (4) shows the estimation results of equation (3.6) that includes both
the expected and unexpected number of disasters for each district in each survey
year. Consistent with the finding in column (2), women in districts with unexpected
disaster shock works 3% fewer weeks than otherwise, while the coefficient on the
expected number of disasters is statistically insignificant. Statistical tests show that
I can reject equality of the expected and unexpected number of disasters.
Column (6) estimates equation (3.6) with only the unexpected number of
disasters as a regressor of interest and I can reject that its impact on female labor
supplied on the market is zero (significant at the 5% level). Specifically, I show that
women respond to unexpected disasters in their districts of residence by working
3% fewer weeks a year.7
Table 3.7 shows the results of equation (3.7) in which I estimate the equivalent
model for men. The use of the sector-year-province average wage for men is a strong
instrument for self-reported wages. In contrast to female labor, I find that across
all specifications, the effect of any unexpected disaster is statistically zero for men.
These results imply that for individuals who already participate in the labor force
as paid workers in non-agricultural sectors, unexpected disaster shock reduces the
quantity of female labor supplied only with no impact on men.8
7Table 3.15 in Appendix F presents the results of estimating equation (3.6) with the standard
errors clustered at the district (kabupaten) levels. The signs and magnitude of coefficients are
consistent with those presented in Table 3.6.
8Table 3.16 in Appendix F presents the results of estimating equation (3.7) with the standard
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Table 3.8 shows the results of a probit model that examines the impacts of nat-
ural hazards on participation in voluntary labor. Similar to market labor, I consider
male and female voluntary labor participation separately. In contrast to the find-
ing that female market labor responds to unexpected disasters, I find that districts
with more expected disasters are associated with a reduction in the probability of
women supplying voluntary labor (significant at the 5% level). The coefficient on
unexpected disasters is positive but statistically zero. Statistical tests show that
I can reject the impact of expected and unexpected disasters are identical. This
result suggests that female market and voluntary labor supplied respond differently
to unexpected weather outcomes. Only the former is affected. Columns (4) to (6)
show that the coefficients of unexpected disasters on male participation in voluntary
labor are negative but statistically zero.
3.5.2 Borrowing
Table 3.9 presents results of changes in household borrowing in the aftermath
of natural hazards. While households do not resort to more borrowing in response
to level shocks as shown in column (1), column (2) shows statistical evidence that
households in districts with more unexpected disasters have higher probabilities
of borrowing (significant at the 5% level). However, statistical tests fail to reject
that the impact of expected and unexpected disasters have identical impacts on the
probability of household borrowing.
errors clustered at the district (kabupaten) levels. The signs and magnitude of coefficients are
consistent with those presented in Table 3.7.
89
Examining the intensive margins of borrowing, I do not find statistical evi-
dence that borrowing households in districts with more level shocks obtain larger
loans. Instead, households respond to unexpected shocks. Column (6) shows that
households in districts with an unexpected disaster obtain loans that are 7% larger
in value (significant at the 5% level). Controlling for disasters, households associated
with more borrowing include those that are larger in size, with higher non-labor in-
comes, and have members with higher education. Moreover, households with more
children, particularly those who are six years and older, obtain loans that are 63%
higher (significant at the 1% level).
Table 3.10 shows results of individual participation and supply of credit in
arisan meetings, a form of rotating community credit organization in Indonesia.
Consistent with household borrowing, individual participation in arisan only re-
sponds positively to unexpected disaster shock, but not to level disaster shock as
measured by the total number of disasters in a district per survey year (significant at
the 5% levels). For individuals who participate in arisan, an individual contributes
6% less per meeting in districts with an unexpected disaster. In both the extensive
and intensive margins, women are more likely to participate in arisan meetings than
men of the same household. However, conditional on participation at these meet-
ings, I do not find evidence that contributions by women and men are systematically
different.
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3.5.3 Robustness: Objective Measures of Disaster Intensity
As a robustness check, I explore the impact of the intensity of disasters on
the main outcome variables of interest - market labor, voluntary labor, household
borrowing and participation in arisan meetings - using objective measures rather
than levels of severity that households self-report. Specifically, I restrict attention
to earthquakes and floods as they each have well-defined and reliable measures of
disaster intensity. Specifically, I use the Richter scale to measure the intensity of
earthquakes and the flood magnitude, defined by the Dartmouth Flood Observatory,
to measure the intensity of floods.9 For each district in each survey year, I calculate
the average magnitude for all earthquakes and floods.
Table 3.11 of Appendix F reports the impact of earthquake and flood intensity
on female weeks worked in a year. In the first stage estimation, the sector-year-
province average wage for females remain a strong instrument, with an F-statistic
of 22.32 (significant at the 1% level). Column (2) reports the second stage estimation
in which flood magnitude has a statistically zero impact on female labor supplied.
In contrast, for each additional unit increase on the Richter scale for the average
earthquake in a district, women work 0.03% fewer weeks on the market (significant
at the 5% level). While this reduction in female labor supplied is consistent with that
associated with unexpected disasters, the magnitude of the impact of earthquake
intensity is small.
9As defined by the Dartmouth Flood Observatory, flood magnitude = log(duration x
severity x affected area); severity: 1 = large flood events (1-2 decade return period);
1.5 = very large events (> 2 decades); 2 = extreme events (> 100 years). (See
http://floodobservatory.colorado.edu/Archives/ArchiveNotes.html for details).
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Table 3.12 repeats this analysis on male market labor. In contrast to the result
for female market labor, I find that each additional unit increase on the Richter scale
for the average earthquake in a district, men work 0.04% more weeks on the market
(significant at the 5% level).10
In terms of voluntary labor, I show in Table 3.13 that the impact of flood and
earthquake magnitudes have consistent impact on female voluntary labor but the
opposite impact on male voluntary labor. Specifically, men and women who reside
in districts with more serious earthquakes are more likely to participate in unpaid
labor in the community (significant at the 1% and 10% levels). However, while
women are more likely to participate in voluntary labor in districts that experience
more serious floods (significant at the 5% level), I find a reduction in the probability
of voluntary labor participation among men (significant at the 1% level). A possible
interpretation of this contrasting result between male and female voluntary labor
is that the majority of voluntary work in the aftermath of earthquakes are likely
related to construction and rebuilding while that following floods is related to work
that requires less physical labor, such as cleaning up debris on streets.
Finally, Table 3.14 shows that earthquake and flood intensity has statistically
zero impact on household borrowing and individual participation in arisan meet-
ings. This result complements the finding reported in Table 3.10, suggesting that
household and individual borrowing are a function of the frequency but not the
severity of natural disasters.
10I repeat the analysis with the standard errors clustered at the district (kabupaten) levels.
Tables 3.17 and 3.18 in Appendix F display the results. The signs and magnitude of coefficients
are consistent with those presented in Tables 3.11 and 3.12, respectively.
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter attempts to explore how households cope with natural hazards
through behavioral adjustments ex-post. I focus on three outcomes: market and
volunteer labor, borrowing, and informal credit. To isolate plausibly exogenous
disaster shocks, I exploit the historic nature of disaster data to predict the number
of disasters for each district in each year.
Two main patterns emerge in the results that are consistent across the three
outcomes. First, households respond to unexpected rather than level shocks. Sec-
ond, there are gender differences in the labor and informal credit outcomes. In
particular, women from districts with more unexpected disasters work 3% to 8%
fewer weeks a year as paid workers in non-agricultural sectors. Further, while more
men supply voluntary labor than woman throughout the study period, unexpected
disasters are associated with higher probabilities of participation in female volun-
tary labor only. I find no statistically significant impacts for men in either labor
outcome.
In terms of participation in rotating credit groups, although women participate
to a larger extent in both the extensive and intensive margins regardless of expo-
sure to natural hazards, unexpected disaster shocks are associated with increased
probabilities of attendance but lower-valued contributions per meeting for men and
women.
Future work will extend the current analysis by analyzing the mechanisms
behind the differential results between men and women in terms of market labor.
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The first mechanism to examine is that there is a cultural reason for women to
be restricted from working as paid labor on the market in the context of natural
disasters. It is important to understand whether this restriction creates a welfare
loss such that it bears the policy implication to lift the restrictions. An alternative
mechanism is that women who live in districts with more unexpected disasters work
less is a result of collective individual responses. For example, the marginal revenue
from home production may increase in the aftermath of disasters such that the
marginal revenue from working on the market is lower. Another possibility is that
women’s occupations on the market are systematically different from men’s. If the
majority of women are teachers, for example, a natural disaster that causes school
closures may lead to reductions in labor supplied among a higher percentage of
women and only a small share of male market labor.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Natural Hazards in IFLS Districts from 1900 to 2008                     Figure 1. Distributi n of natural h r s in IFLS districts from 1900 to 2008 
 






























              
                   Source: Author’s calculation using the matched sample of Indonesian Family Life Survey and BNPB disaster  
                   database (http://www.bnpb.go.id). Map is from http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/indonesia_admin_map.htm. 
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Table 3.1: Main Sources of Loan and Distribution of Borrowing Households from Indonesia
in 1997, 2000 and 2007
Table 1. Main sources of loan and distribution of borrowing households from Indonesia  
               in 1997, 2000 and 2007. 
!
!
Sources of loan % of borrowing households 
Bank (private commercial, government, semi-government, agricultural) 48.88 
Cooperative 25.49 
Neighborhood association 0.53 
Arisan 0.33 
Money lender 10.97 
Workplace 0.85 
Pawnshop 0.90 
Non-bank financial institution 4.24 
Other 7.80 
Note: Households can report multiple sources of loans, thus a sample of N 
borrowing households give rise to K>N observations in this column.   
 !
!





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lagged variables (last year)




District fixed effects yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes
Observations 7311 7311
R-squared 0.450 0.270
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All disasters




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this section, I develop a collective household model with shocks to labor
supply from natural hazards. I follow closely the collective model in Chiappori,
Fortin and Lacroix (2002) but also draw on Jayachandran (2006) and Browning
and Gortz (2012). In our framework, the household consists of two individuals, one
male and one female. Under the collective framework, the intrahousehold decision
process always leads to Pareto-efficient outcomes.
C.2 Assumptions
Formally, let mi and ci, for i = [m, f ] , denote, respectively, the male or female
household member’s market labor supply and consumption of a private Hicksian
composite good. I set the price of the private good to unity, and each member
receives a wage wi for supplying labor on the market. The household also en-
gages in the domestic production of food crops according to the production function




f , where fi denotes member i’s farm labor supply. Without
loss of generality, I assume that domestic production uses only labor inputs. The
parameters β ∈ (0, 1) and η ∈ (0, 1) represent the relative efficiencies of male and
female labor in domestic production. Let q denote total domestic output, which is
the sum of the male consumption of crops, qm, female consumption of crops, qf , and
cash crops, qa, to be sold on the market for a price P . I focus on the allocation
of labor in domestic production and labor on the market. Therefore, total labor
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supply, T , is exogenous and in the form T ≥ fi +mi.
Household members have identical Stone-Geary preferences over private good
and food crops consumption:




where γ ∈ (0, 1). Individuals must consume at least the subsistence level of
crops q ≥ 0. I consider the general case of “caring” individuals (Becker 1991), that
is, individuals whose preferences are represented by a utility function that depends
on their own egotistic utility as well as their spouses’. Formally, member i’s welfare
function can be expressed in the form:
Ψi = Ui(ci, qi) + λiUj(cj, qj)
where i, j = [m, f ] and i 6= j. Ψi is continuous, increasing, and quasi-concave
in egotistic utilities Ui and Uj. λi ∈ (0, 1) describes the extent member i cares about
member j’s utility. I exclude the possibilities that member i dislikes her partner such
that λi < 0 or member i cares more about her partner than herself such that λi > 1.
Taking a weighted average of each member’s welfare function, I can express
the household welfare function as :
Ψh = θΨm + (1− θ)Ψf = νUm(cm, qm) + Uf (cf , qf )
where ν, the Pareto weight, is a composite function of λm, λf and the weight
θ. The Pareto weight represents the relative weight of the male household member
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in the household decision process.
C.3 Household Maximization Problem
Let y denote the amount of non-labor income that the household receives.
For any given (wm, wf , y, P ), there exists a Pareto weight ν such that (ci, qi,mi, fi)
solves the following household problem:
max
ci,qi,mi,fi
νUm(cm, qm) + Uf (cf , qf )
subject to
cm + cf ≤ P (F − qm − qf ) + y +mmwm +mfwf
mf ≤ m,
fi +mi ≤ T,
where the constraint mf ≤ m represents an upper limit on a woman’s market
hours of work in the presence of natural hazards. This constraint reflects social
norms that deem women more vulnerable to work outside of the home after disas-
ters. In addition, anthropological evidence suggests that Indonesian women assume
the roles of caretakers for children and the elderly in times of shocks, for example,
after the 2004 Tsunami (Hellwig and Tagliacozzo 2009). Thus, this constraint al-
lows us to consider the possibility that women who experience natural disasters may
find her optimal market labor supply, m∗f , being restricted to a sub-optimal level, m.
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C.4 Optimality Conditions
The first order conditions (FOCs) are summarized in Appendix D. They imply
different conditions on farm and market labor supply between men and women.





where Fmf is the marginal product of male farm labor. The intuition here is
that the wage of male market labor is equal to the wage of male farm labor. By
the assumption of the model, natural disasters have no impact on the marginal
productivity of male labor on the farm.
For female members, I derive the following condition from the FOCs:
PF ff =

wf if d = 0,
wf − α2
Ufc
if d = 1.
where d = [0, 1] is an indicator function of the occurrence of natural disasters.
The left-hand-side of the condition represents the wage of female farm labor and
is analogous to that in the male labor condition. Under the no-disaster scenario,
d = 0, the farm wage is equal to the market wage of female labor. Under the disaster
scenario, d = 1, the farm wage is equal to the market wage of female labor plus the
term − α2
Ufc
if and only if the constraint mf ≤ m is binding. In other words, if the
optimal level of female market labor supply is restricted to a sub-optimal level, m,
such that m∗f = m, then α2 > 0 and PF
f
f = wf − α2Ufc holds.
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The intuition here is that for any given (wf , P ) and when α2 > 0,
F ff (d = 1) < F
f
f (d = 0).
Hence, for a given level of domestic output, ff (d = 1) > ff (d = 0). Since
ff +mf ≤ T , this increase in female labor on the farm reflects a reduction in market
labor supply under the disaster scenario. This result provides a testable condition
on female market labor supply in the empirical analysis.
C.5 Theoretical Results
Relationship between Market Labor Supply and Wage
Appendix E gives the optimal expressions for farm and market labor supply.
Taking comparative statics of labor supply with respect to wages, I arrive at the
following implications. First, the theory implies a substitution effect as ∂m∗m/∂w
∗
m >
0. When the male market wage increases, the theory predicts an increase in the male
market labor supply as he substitutes time away from leisure. Similarly, the theory




By our assumption, natural disasters only impact the model through its effect
on limiting women’s market labor supply. Thus, the relationship between wage and
market labor supply remains unchanged for men with and without disasters.
Under the no-disaster scenario, the expression between female market labor
supply and female wage is in the form:
11I consider the effects of each partner’s wage on the other partner’s labor supply in a later
extension of the model.
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This relationship only depends on the relative efficiencies of male and female
farm labor in domestic food crops production, the price of cash crops, and the
market wage for female.
Under the disaster scenario, the equivalent expression is in the form:















Here, the relationship depends not only on a given (wf , η, β, P ), but also her
marginal utility of private goods consumption and α2, the Lagrange multiplier of
the time allocation constraint. Since η ∈ (0, 1) and α2 ∈ (0, 1), I can see that




f (d = 0)/∂w
∗
f . In other words, when the time allocation
constraint on women’s labor supply is binding due to natural disasters, women’s
market labor supply becomes more responsive to changes in wages at every wage
level. Figure 1 depicts this change in the wage and labor supply relationship.This
implication provides a testable hypothesis in the behavior of Indonesian women’s
labor supply in the empirical analysis.
Elasticity of Labor Supply










On one hand, the elasticity of male market labor with respect to his wage, ζm,
is identical under both disaster and no-disaster scenarios. On the other hand, since I
know for female household members that for a given (w∗f , P, η), ∂m
∗
f (d = 1)/∂w
∗
f >
∂m∗f (d = 0)/∂w
∗
f . Thus, any remaining difference between ζf (d = 1) and ζf (d = 0)
depends on m∗f (d = 0) and m
∗
f (d = 1).
In the no-disaster scenario, I can express the optimal female labor supply on
the market as:






In the disaster scenario and when the time allocation constraint is binding,
optimal female labor supply can be expressed as:









Here, I can see that m∗f (d = 1) < m
∗
f (d = 0). Thus, for a given (w
∗
f , P, η),
I can conclude that w∗f/m
∗




f (d = 0). Hence, in the presence of
natural disasters and when the time allocation constraint on women’s market labor
supply is binding, that is, when α2 > 0, the elasticity of female market labor with




L = νUm(cm, qm) + Uf (cf , qf )
+ α1[P (F − qm − qf ) + y +mmwm +mfwf − [cm + cf ]
+ α2[m−mf ]
+ α3[T − fm −mm]































(3.14) and (3.16) =⇒ Umq = Umc P
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(3.15) and (3.17) =⇒ U fq = U fc P
∂L
∂fm












: α3 = α1wm (3.20)
∂L
∂mf




The interior solution to the maximization problem gives the following expressions
for farm and market labor supply:





































Log weekly wage Log of yearly weeks worked
Earthquake magnitude 0.145 -0.0365**
(0.0967) (0.0162)
Flood magnitude -0.0823 -0.0134
(0.0737) (0.0158)
Sector-gender-province-year wage (instrument) 1.645***
(0.348)
Log weekly wage (instrumented) 0.0339
(0.0308)




Age squared -0.00319*** -0.000446***
(0.000783) (0.000172)




Chi squared statistic of testing:
Instrument = 0 22.32*** -
Earthquake = Flood - 1.17
Earthquake = 0 - 5.10**
Flood = 0 - 0.71
Observations 1,727 1,558
Note: Clustered (household level) standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All specifications include district (kabupaten), household, and year fixed effects.
Women
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Log weekly wage Log of yearly weeks worked
Earthquake magnitude -0.0454 0.0361**
(0.0480) (0.0178)
Flood magnitude -0.0135 0.00672
(0.0515) (0.0135)
Sector-gender-province-year wage (instrument) 1.886***
(0.321)
Log weekly wage (instrumented) -0.0121
(0.0276)




Age squared -0.00362*** -0.000361**
(0.000667) (0.000167)




Chi squared statistic of testing:
Instrument = 0 34.5*** -
Earthquake = Flood - 1.86
Earthquake = 0 - 4.09**
Flood = 0 - 0.25
Observations 2,011 1,992
Note: Clustered (household level) standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All specifications include district (kabupaten), household, and year fixed effects.
Men
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Earthquake magnitude 0.0652* 0.0150 0.0942*** 0.0257
(0.0390) (0.0276)
Flood magnitude 0.0657** 0.0151 -0.102*** -0.0279
(0.0303) (0.0249)
Age -0.00241 -0/000553 0.0861*** 0.0235
(0.0215) (0.0208)
# of children under 5 years old -0.117* -0.0268 0.0271 0.00739
(0.0604) (0.0450)
# of children between 6 to 14 years old 0.0135 0.00310 -0.0619* -0.0169
(0.0437) (0.0349)





Chi squared statistic of testing:
Earthquake = Flood 0.00 - 26.71*** -
Earthquake = 0 2.8* - 13.51*** -
Flood = 0 4.71** - 16.05*** -
Observations 2,085 - 3,164 -
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Log weekly wage Log of yearly weeks worked
Earthquake magnitude 0.108 -0.0292**
(0.0785) (0.0119)
Flood magnitude -0.0286 -0.00344
(0.0730) (0.0121)
Sector-gender-province-year wage (instrument) 1.558***
(0.320)
Log weekly wage (instrumented) 0.0642**
(0.0289)




Age squared -0.00324*** -0.000372**
(0.000842) (0.000167)




Chi squared statistic of testing:
Instrument = 0 23.68*** -
Earthquake = Flood - 2.57
Earthquake = 0 - 6.03**
Flood = 0 - 0.08
Observations 1,727 1,558
Note: Clustered (kabupaten level) standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All specifications include household and year fixed effects.
Women
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Log weekly wage Log of yearly weeks worked
Earthquake magnitude -0.0215 0.00982
(0.0370) (0.00720)
Flood magnitude 0.0343 -0.00632
(0.0399) (0.00763)
Sector-gender-province-year wage (instrument) 1.809***
(0.287)
Log weekly wage (instrumented) -0.0267
(0.0274)




Age squared -0.00376*** -0.000411***
(0.000632) (0.000154)




Chi squared statistic of testing:
Instrument = 0 39.71*** -
Earthquake = Flood - 2.46
Earthquake = 0 - 1.86**
Flood = 0 - 0.69
Observations 2,011 1,992
Note: Clustered (kabupaten level) standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All specifications include household and year fixed effects.
Men
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Chapter 4: Natural Disasters and Vulnerability:
Evidence from the 1997 Forest Fires
4.1 Introduction
Natural disasters have led to enormous economic and human losses in the last
two decades. In particular, catastrophes such as the December 2004 tsunami in
the Indian Ocean, the October 2005 earthquake in Pakistan, the September 2005
hurricane and inundation of New Orleans, the May 2008 earthquake in China and
cyclone in Myanmar, and the February 2011 earthquake in New Zealand have called
public attention to the enormous human and monetary costs of natural hazards.
While all human beings are vulnerable to natural disasters, the poor seem
to be affected most. Indeed, 90% of disaster victims worldwide live in developing
countries, where poverty and population pressures compel poor people to live on
flood plains, in earthquake-prone zones, and on unstable hillsides (Annan 1999).
Moreover, rural households often lack insurance against such risks. However, poor
households are not necessarily vulnerable. For example, a household with very
low but stable expected consumption may be poor, but another household with a
higher expected consumption and greater risks is arguably more vulnerable. As
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such, targeting households that are both poor and vulnerable is fundamental to
poverty reduction strategies (World Bank 2000).
The goal of this research is to investigate the link between households’ poverty
and vulnerability resulting from natural disasters, where “vulnerability” refers to re-
ductions in the distribution of household consumption. By combining two waves of
survey data from Indonesia, this chapter estimates and analyzes the role that a
costly natural disaster plays in contributing to households’ vulnerability, control-
ling for household characteristics which are themselves important determinants of
vulnerability. Since natural disasters have an observable and adverse impact on
macroeconomies in the short-run (Noy 2009), we consider the 1997 forest fires as
an aggregate risk that affects households in the same way and we hypothesize that
households who are more affected by the smoke from the fires are more vulnerable.
While we are agnostic about the specific vehicle by which smoke affects households’
vulnerability, possibilities include loss of income due to respiratory illness associated
with suspended air particulates, business closures, and reductions in social services
either because financial resources are re-allocated to combating the fires or because
institutions close as a result of the smoke.
The analysis proceeds in two parts. First, we apply Ligon and Schechter
(2003)’s utility measure of vulnerability to the Indonesian panel data to estimate
and decompose vulnerability into its distinct sources. Specifically, vulnerability of
the population is calculated by summing vulnerability across households. Second, we
use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model to examine the relationship
between household characteristics and vulnerability in total and food consumption.
125
We find that households who earn more off-farm income and are headed by
more educated individuals are less vulnerable, meaning that their total expenditures
and food expenditures are less affected by natural disasters than households without
off-farm income. Surprisingly, we also find that households who experienced some
form of exogenous shocks, such as the death or the loss of employment of a household
member, also face less vulnerability. This result suggests that these households have
lower vulnerability, perhaps because they lost economically unproductive members.
We also find that the 1997 forest fires affect households’ vulnerability in total con-
sumption but not in food consumption. Moreover, we find that the forest fires do
not contribute to vulnerability as an aggregate risk.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents a summary
of the economic, sociological and disaster management literature on the topic of
vulnerability. Section 4.3 provides a detailed description of the 1997 forest fires in
Indonesia. Section 4.4 presents the empirical strategy used to estimate vulnerability
in the context of Indonesia’s forest fires. Section 4.5 presents an overview of the
data. Section 4.6 presents the results of the econometric estimations, and Section
4.7 concludes and discusses the findings, policy implications, limitations and possible
extensions of this study.
4.2 Estimating Vulnerability in Developing Countries
In general, “vulnerability” refers to the possibility that a negative outcome
would move a household into poverty and force household members to reduce current
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consumption to smooth consumption in the long run. For example, Pritchett, et
al. (2000) define vulnerability as the risk that a household will fall into poverty
at least once in the next few years. In this case, vulnerability is forward-looking
and is measured as a probability. Alternatively, Amin et al. (2003) estimate a
baseline vulnerability measure for households based on a model of risk-sharing that
assumes household consumption moves only with aggregate consumption and not
with household income (Deaton 1997).
This literature tends to focus on macroeconomic risks such as a collapse in
food production (e.g., Maxwell, et.al. 2000). Thus, the term “vulnerability” is used
to describe a state of “food insecurity”1 and the outcome of interest is the proportion
of the total household budget spent on food. Significant effort has been devoted to
predicting this outcome, employing measures such as rainfall patterns, forest cover,
and soil productivity to spatially identify areas that are vulnerable to crop failures
and food insecurity (e.g., Carter and May 1999).
In contrast, the disaster management literature has attempted to estimate
vulnerability with respect to natural disasters as a particular source of risk. For ex-
ample, Kreimer and Arnold (2000) start from the premise that people, households,
and communities are vulnerable to damage from natural disasters. Consequently,
their work defines vulnerability as an underlying condition distinct from the risky
events that may trigger a disaster (e.g., Webb 1993). In other words, even if trig-
gers of natural disasters occur, household and social systems either enable or inhibit
1Barrett (1999), for instance, defines food insecurity as “the risk of irreversible physical or
mental impairment due to insufficient intake of macronutrients or micronutrients.”
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disasters through their responses. For example, Wisner et al. (1994) define vul-
nerability as the “characteristics of a person or group in terms of their capacity to
anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of a natural disaster.”
This chapter adopts Ligon and Schechter (2003)’s measure of vulnerability,
defined as the difference between the household’s utility of expected consumption
(i.e., consuming some particular bundle with certainty) and its expected utility of
consumption. While many measures of vulnerability rely on the expected value
of Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measures, thus tending to assign too much risk
to poor households, Ligon and Schechter’s measure adopts a utility framework to
capture the effects of risk on household welfare. This measure is advantageous
to our study because vulnerability can be decomposed into distinct measures of
poverty, measurement error, and exposures to aggregate risk, idiosyncratic risk,
and unexplained risk. In this way, we can examine both the impact of household
characteristics on household vulnerability in consumption and the impact on the
decomposed measures of vulnerability.
4.3 The Indonesian Forest Fires
Indonesia has historically been a disaster-prone country, with at least 399 nat-
ural disasters recorded between 1907 and 2010 (Emergency Events Database 2011).
Events ranging from cyclones, droughts, earthquakes, floods and forest fires have
affected a total of nearly 28 million people. The nine recorded incidences of forest
fires over the 87-year period of record have cost 300 lives and have caused over
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US$9.3 billion in damages, the highest of all natural hazards that struck Indonesia.2
Moreover, forest fires have far-reaching health consequences that are not limited to
residents in the areas of burning. For instance, the 1997 fires in Indonesia produced
visibility-limiting haze that caused traffic accidents and slowdowns, school and busi-
ness closures, and increased incidence of respiratory health conditions. Moreover,
easterly and southeasterly winds spread haze from the fires over an area far larger
than where the fires occurred, adversely affecting people who did not initially live
near the fires (Frankenberg et al. 2005). Prenatal exposure to smoke from the fires
contributed to over 15,000 “missing children” across the country (Jayachandran
2009).
The 1997 forest fires were the largest in the country’s history, burning some
five million hectares of forests. The fires occurred on two major islands, Sumatra
and Kalimantan, where population densities are low and considerable portions of
the land area are covered by tropical rain forests. In many areas, however, the forest
floor is covered with a flammable layer of dried organic material, which contributed
to the islands’ susceptibility to fires (Frankenberg et al. 2005).
In addition to ecological factors, the agricultural economies of Sumatra and
Kalimantan also played a role in triggering the 1997 fires. Specifically, timber and
plantation licenses that have been granted in recent years increased the quantity of
land designated for commercial purposes, producing more flammable debris and fire
used for clearing larger areas of land than does subsistence farming. In addition,
2For example, Emergency Events Database (2011) estimates the economic damage of the 1997
fires to Indonesia to be US$8 billion, greatly exceeding the US$4.5 billion economic damages to
Indonesia stemming from the 2004 tsunami.
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the Indonesian government’s efforts to relieve densely-populated islands such as Java
and Bali of population pressures by relocating residents to more rural areas increase
the number of small-scale farmers who use fire to clear land (Ketterings et al. 1999).
Further, fires have sometimes been used as a threat in land disputes (Glover and
Jessup 1999). Each of these factors may have contributed to the large-scale forest
fires that developed in the fall of 1997.
The forest fires were concentrated on the southern parts of Kalimantan and
the eastern parts of Sumatra, leaving densely populated areas such as the island
of Java unaffected. Nevertheless, Frankenberg et al. (2005) show that unlike the
fire itself, the haze spread across nearby islands, spanning over 300 million square
kilometers and potentially affecting tens of millions of people.
4.4 Empirical Specification
Indonesian households’ vulnerability with respect to the 1997 forest fires is in-
vestigated in two parts. First, a utility model estimates the vulnerability of sampled
households and decomposes the sources of vulnerability into four types of risks. Sec-
ond, multivariate regression is used to determine the net effect of the 1997 forest fires
on vulnerability after controlling for household characteristics. Each of the compo-
nents of vulnerability is also regressed against the same household characteristics to
provide a more nuanced analysis of the determinants of vulnerability.
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4.4.1 The Utility Model
Ligon and Schechter (2003) propose a measure of vulnerability which can be decom-
posed into poverty, aggregate risk, idiosyncratic risk, and unexplained risk. Specif-
ically, suppose that there exists a finite population of households i = 1, 2, ..., n;
ci denotes household i’s consumption expenditures, which more directly and accu-
rately determine household welfare than measures of income or wealth. To measure
vulnerability, an arbitrary, strictly increasing, weakly concave function U i : R→ R
mapping consumption expenditures onto the real line is chosen for each household,
where U i(c) = (c1−γ)/(1− γ) for some parameter γ > 0. As γ 3 increases, the func-
tion U i becomes increasingly concave, i.e., sensitive to risk (Friedman and Savage
1948). Given U i, the vulnerability of the household with respect to consumption is
thus defined as:
V i(c) = [U i(z)− U i(Eci)] (Poverty)
+ [U i(Eci)− EU i(ci)] (Risk)
(4.1)
Here, z is some certainty-equivalent consumption level such that if household
i’s consumption is greater than or equal to z, the household is not regarded as
vulnerable;4 U i(z) is the utility of household i’s consumption if they consume z
3In keeping with the estimates of this parameter in the literature and following Ligon and
Schechter (2002), we set γ = 2.
4z is often interpreted as a poverty line. However, Ravallion and Bidani (1994) show that
Indonesia’s poverty profile is highly sensitive to small changes in the poverty line. In addition,
Pradhan et al (2000) argue that while Indonesia’s prevailing poverty line accurately reflects min-
imum subsistence income in some geographic areas, it over- or understates the amount of income
needed in other areas. Hence, we set z equal to the average consumption of surveyed households.
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and U i(Eci) is the utility of household i’s expected consumption; and EU i(ci) is
household i’s expected utility of consumption.
The first bracketed term measures poverty by calculating the difference be-
tween a concave function evaluated at z and at household i’s expected consumption
expenditures. The concavity of the function U i implies that as Eci approaches the
poverty line from below, an additional unit of expected consumption has diminishing
marginal value in reducing poverty.
The second bracketed term measures the risk - uncertainties or contingencies
that will affect the probabilities with which households obtain their expected level
of consumption - faced by each household. In other words, it measures the difference
between the household’s utility of expected consumption and the expected utility
of consumption. This difference is represented by the distance between points A
and B in Figure 4.1. Consider two different scenarios. In the first scenario, each
household faces two consumption periods. There exists a probability ρ that the
household obtains the consumption bundle c1 and a probability of (1 − ρ) that it
obtains the bundle c2 in both periods. The household’s utility in this scenario can
then be expressed as EU(c), where
U{c1, c2; ρ, (1− ρ)} = ρU(c1) + (1− ρ)U(c2) (4.2)
In the second scenario, each household receives the consumption bundle E(c)
with certainty. The utility of the second scenario can then be expressed simply
as U(Ec). A risk-averse household would prefer to have consumption bundle E(c)
with certainty in both periods to having EU(c) with uncertainty. Thus, the vertical
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distance between point A, or U(Ec), and point B, or EU(c), represents the risk that
each household faces.
A possible third scenario is the certainty-equivalent allocation. In this case,
each household would obtain consumption bundle z with certainty. The utility of
this allocation is U(z), represented by point E on the utility function. The distance
between the points B and E represents poverty in the utility model if we consider z
to be analogous to a poverty line.
Further, the risk measure in equation (4.1) can be decomposed into three dis-
tinct sources of risk: aggregate risks (risks that affect the entire economy such as
changes in economy-wide wages or returns to capital that may, for example, be in-
duced during a depression or a currency crisis), idiosyncratic risks (risks that are
specific to the individual household such as the loss of employment of the house-
hold head or the sickness of a household member), and unexplained risks, which are
analogous to the error, which is due to variation in unobserved factors and to mea-
surement error in consumption. Thus, the above model is decomposable as follows:
V i(c) = [U i(z)− U i(Eci)] (Poverty)
+ {U i(Ecit)− EU i[E(cit|x̄t)]} (AggregateRisk)
+ {EU i[E(cit|x̄t)]− EU i[E(cit|x̄t, xit)]} (IdiosyncracticRisk)
+ {EU i[E(cit|x̄t, xit)]− EU i(cit)} (UnexplainedRisk&Meas.Error)
(4.3)




resents its idiosyncratic variables; x̄t is a vector of aggregate variables; and E(c
i|x̄)
denotes the expected level of consumption, ci, conditional on a vector of aggregate
variables, x̄. Thus, the second bracketed term measures the aggregate risk faced
by households, the third bracketed term measures idiosyncratic risk, and the fourth
bracketed term measures unexplained risk.
Idiosyncratic risk can be attributed to the variation in k observed time-varying
household characteristics xit = {xi1t, ..., xikt} (see Appendix G). To examine the con-
tribution of changes in specific variables to a household’s idiosyncratic risk, we
disaggregate idiosyncratic risk into three components: risk arising from variation in
income, either from farm or non-farm labor; from changes in the amount of debt
that the household owes at the time of the survey; and from exogenous shocks such
as the death and/or the loss of employment of a household member in the past five
years. Finally, to estimate the contributions of each type of risk to vulnerability in
total consumption and food consumption, respectively, the magnitudes and statisti-
cal significance of each distinct source of vulnerability are compared. Estimates are
obtained using Ligon and Schechter (2003)’s vulnerability routine in Stata in which
consumption is estimated in levels.5
4.4.2 The Ordinary Least Squares Model
We estimate household vulnerability and further decompose it into the portion that
comes from poverty, aggregate risk, idiosyncratic risk, and unexplained risk, re-
5We also estimated all models using logged values of consumption. The results are consistent
with those presented here.
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spectively. We then regress each element of vulnerability on a set of household
characteristics. The general specification is:
V ulnerability = β0 + β1Age+ β2Male+ β3Married+ β4Primaryed
+ β5Secondaryed+ β6Smoke+ β7Farmbusp
+ β8Nfarmbusp+ β9Credit+ β10Eshock + ε
(4.4)
Here, Age is the age of the head of household; Male is a dummy which equals 1 if the
household is headed by a male and 0 if otherwise; Married is a dummy which equals
1 if the head of household is married and 0 if otherwise; Primaryed is a dummy
which equals 1 if the head of household’s highest level of education is primary school;
Secondaryed is a dummy which equals 1 if the head of household’s highest level of
education is secondary school; the omitted dummy variable is Tertiaryed, which
equals 1 if the head of household’s highest level of education is college or university;
Smoke measures smoke and other air pollutants at each enumeration point at the
time that the survey was conducted; Farmbusp is the income a household earns from
providing farm labor in 1993; Nfarmbusp is the initial income a household gains
from off-farm labor in 1993; Credit is the debt-total income ratio for each household
at the time of the survey that functions as a proxy for its level of borrowing relative
to its access to credit; and Shock is a dummy which equals 1 if a household has
experienced some form of exogenous shocks such as the death or loss of employment
of a household member in the previous 5 years from 1997.
Equation (4.3) is estimated under 10 general specifications: Model I regresses
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household vulnerability in total consumption against a set of household character-
istics, including FarmHH, a dummy which equals 1 if the household owns a farm
business; Model II regresses the portion of vulnerability which comes from poverty
against the same set of household characteristics; Model III focuses on the portion of
vulnerability which comes from aggregate risk; Model IV investigates idiosyncratic
risk; and Model V accounts for unexplained risk. Further, food insecurity, defined
as the risk of serious physical or mental impairment due to insufficient intake of
nutrients, is also likely to be affected by risk (Barrett 1999), whether aggregate, id-
iosyncratic, or unexplained. The proportion of a household’s budget spent on food
is thus an important indicator of an individual’s livelihood (Maxwell et al. 2000).
Thus, Models VI to X repeat the above estimations but focus instead on household
vulnerability in food consumption. Since the effect of exposure to smoke on vulner-
ability may be different for households with different educational backgrounds,6 the
level of smoke at the time of survey enumeration is also interacted separately with
education dummies in additional specifications.
4.5 Data Description
4.5.1 Data
The consumption data in this study come from the first and second waves of
the Indonesian Family Life survey (IFLS), collected in 1993 and in 1997, respec-
6We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this possibility to our attention.
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tively.7 Conducted in 1993, the first wave of the IFLS is a socioeconomic and health
survey based on a sample of households representing about 83% of the Indonesian
population living in 13 of the nation’s 26 provinces (Frankenberg and Karoly 1995).
Among other topics, the survey gathered data on income, food expenditures, con-
sumption expenditures, and community resources. The IFLS also surveyed health
and education facilities in sampled communities. In total, it includes 7,224 house-
holds in 321 enumeration areas. The second wave, conducted at the end of 1997,
revisited the same 321 enumeration areas, located the original households, and re-
interviewed all household members. In cases in which survey respondents moved in
the intervening years, interviews were conducted at the new locations provided that
they lay within the 13 provinces enumerated in the first wave of the survey. Remark-
ably, over 94% of the households interviewed in the first wave were re-interviewed
in IFLS2 (Frankenberg and Thomas 2000).
Smoke data are derived from the Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer (TOMS)
Aerosol Index maintained by NASA. These data have been used in a wide range
of applications to understand the atmospheric movement of particles deriving from
forest fires, desert dust storms, biomass burning, and other phenomena. This is the
first instrument to track particles as they cross land/sea boundaries (TOMS 2011),
which is crucial to understanding the spread of smoke in a nation comprised of over
17,500 islands.8 Specifically, the TOMS data for Indonesia span the period from 3
7A potential shortcoming of our data lies in the fact that we have a 2-year panel whereas
asymptotic results for vulnerability typically involve a large t (e.g., Ligon and Schechter (2003)
use a 12-year panel). That being said, Ligon and Schechter (2004) use Monte Carlo simulations to
demonstrate that their estimator of vulnerability (also employed in this analysis) performs better
than static measures of poverty provided at least two rounds of panel data are available.
8See http://toms.gsfc.nasa.gov/aerosols/aerosols v8.html for additional explanation of the
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September to 16 November 1997. We thus match the average TOMS Aerosol Index
for this period to the survey enumeration area in which the household resides to
derive our measure of exposure to smoke.
It is important to note that the fires do not appear to have induced differential
attrition among respondents who lived in areas affected by smoke from the forest
fires. In fact, Frankenberg et al. (2005) point out that respondents in areas affected
by smoke were as likely to die or to move in the three months preceding the IFLS
interview date as respondents who lived in unaffected areas.
We aggregated individual-level data into households to form a panel. We
then dropped households who reported having zero spending on both food and
non-food consumption. The selection criteria yield samples of 7,141 in 1993 and
6,870 observations in 1997. After eliminating households that appear in only one of
the two waves, the two datasets are appended to form a balanced panel of 13,512
observations.9
4.5.2 Summary Statistics
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics of the cross-sectional data in 1993 and
1997. Total consumption and food consumption were 1,309,856 Rupiah and 207,591
Rupiah in 1993 and 160,847 Rupiah and 158,419 Rupiah in 1997, respectively.10
Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle (1999) note the same dramatic decline in expen-
TOMS data, including data assembly and definitions.
9The model was also estimated with an unbalanced panel, and the results are entirely consistent
with those presented for the balanced panel.
10The exchange rate of the Indonesian Rupiah and US dollars during the time period 1st August,
1997 and 1st December, 1997 is 1IDR/0.00032US (average of the specified 123 days).
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ditures, a reduction that they attribute to uncertainty associated with the Asian
Financial Crisis, which represents both a form of aggregate risk because it induces
economy-wide changes and a form of idiosyncratic risk because different households
may be affected differently.11 The dramatic reduction in average total consumption
accompanied by the relatively moderate decline in food consumption suggests that
food consumption expenditures are more resilient to shocks than non-food consump-
tion.12
In both survey years, approximately 25% of households owned a farm business.
Household income from farm and off-farm labor rose slightly between 1993 and
1997, with farm labor income averaging 874,262 Rupiah in 1997 and 500,015 Rupiah
four years prior; and non-farm labor income averaging 1,819,491 Rupiah in 1997
and 1,361,474 Rupiah four years prior. Household debt in 1997 averaged 1,547,515
Rupiah, three times the level in 1993.
In terms of demographics, 76.9% and 81.8% of households were headed by
males in 1993 and 1997, respectively. In 1997, 72.4% household heads were married;
71.1% of them had completed primary school as their highest level of education;
25.1% had graduated from secondary school, and only 3.8% have had tertiary edu-
cation. The share of educational outcomes among these households was about the
same in 1993. Only 10.1% of households in 1997 experienced some form of exoge-
nous shocks as defined previously, while 30.5% of households experienced exogenous
11However, there is little reason to believe that the severity of those impacts should correlate
with the intensity of smoke stemming from the fires. Hence, significant estimates of the impact of
smoke should be independent of the financial crisis.
12Indeed, Frankenberg, Thomas, and Beegle (1999) report a 25% increase in the number of
households falling below the poverty line between 1997 and 1998, noting that households seriously
curtailed expenditures on education, health care, and other non-food forms of consumption.
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shocks in 1993. Finally, on average, households live in areas with an aerosol index of
0.505, which Frankenberg et al. (2005) consider to be a “medium” level of exposure;
however, the standard deviation of 0.76 underscores the high level of heterogeneity
in smoke exposure. Differences in total consumption, food consumption, farm and
off-farm income, and household debt are all statistically significant at the 1% level.
4.6 Results
Table 4.2 presents the estimates of vulnerability in total consumption and food
consumption, respectively. Estimates of vulnerability are further decomposed into
poverty, aggregate risk, idiosyncratic risk, and unexplained risk. To estimate the
contributions of each type of risk to vulnerability, the magnitudes of the percentage
shares of each distinct source in vulnerability are compared. Standard errors are
bootstrapped with 10,000 repetitions.
Poverty is the largest component of vulnerability for both measures, repre-
senting 66.25% of vulnerability in total consumption and 48.81% of vulnerability
in food consumption. Unexplained risk represents 24.21% of vulnerability in total
consumption and 46.79% of vulnerability in food consumption. Interestingly, while
aggregate risk accounts for 9.18% of vulnerability in total consumption and is the
third largest component, it is the smallest facet of vulnerability in food consumption,
representing only 1.21%. Given that vulnerability is defined as the sum of poverty,
aggregate risk, idiosyncratic risk, and unexplained risk in this framework, we can
infer from the differences in the estimates of vulnerability in total and food con-
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sumption that while aggregate risk accounts more for the vulnerability in non-food
consumption, idiosyncratic risk explains to a greater extent household vulnerability
in food consumption. Indeed, idiosyncratic risk explains about 3.15% of households’
vulnerability in food consumption but just 0.11% in total consumption.
4.6.1 Vulnerability in Total Consumption
Table 4.3 presents the correlates between each element of vulnerability in to-
tal consumption on a set of fixed household characteristics. First, the relationship
between households’ exposure to smoke and aggregate risk is statistically zero, im-
plying that households who live in areas that are more affected by smoke are no
more likely to face aggregate risk than those living in areas less affected by smoke.13
Nevertheless, for every 1-unit increase in the TOMS Aerosol Index, households face
a 3.6% increase in vulnerability (significant at the 10% level). This increase in total
vulnerability seems to come from the 7.37% increase in poverty (significant at the
1% level), implying that the 1997 forest fires affect some households’ vulnerability
via poverty instead of aggregate risk.
Meanwhile, the effect of household heads’ education on households’ vulnerabil-
ity is ambiguous. While households with heads who graduated from primary schools
are no more or less vulnerable than those with heads who graduated from universi-
ties, households with heads who graduated from secondary schools face 51.5% less
vulnerability (significant at the 5% level) and 56.20% less poverty (significant at the
13A possible explanation is that aggregate risk is measured as the aggregate risk of the whole
sample, not of the geographic subsamples.
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5% level) than those with heads who graduated from universities. A possible expla-
nation is that only 4.1% of surveyed households have heads with tertiary education
and the lack of variation in data limits the results.
Third, households that are headed by males are less vulnerable, with a re-
duction in vulnerability of 25.7% (significant at the 10% level). A male-headed
household also faces less aggregate risk. Hence, our result partially echoes Ligon
and Schechter (2003)’s finding that male-headed Bulgarian households face lower
aggregate risk. Unlike their related result that finds negligible effects on vulnerabil-
ity, however, we find that households with male heads face significantly lower total
vulnerability.
The marital status of the household head, however, has no affect on vulner-
ability. Nonetheless, households with heads who are married have 1.91% higher
aggregate risk (significant at the 5% level) and have 12.1% lower unexplained risk
(significant at the 5% level). Although it is difficult to interpret the latter result
given the unknown nature of the unexplained risk, marriage of the household head
may proxy for larger families, and such households may be more resilient to risks as
a whole.
Households who own farm businesses face 49.2% more vulnerability than non-
farm households (significant at the 1% level), with 57.8% increase in risk from
poverty and a 1.112% reduction in aggregate risk (significant at the 1% and 10%
levels, respectively). Since farm households face a substantially higher degree of
vulnerability than non-farm households, non-farm income seems to be an important
form of insurance against vulnerability in total consumption.
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Households that have experienced some form of exogenous shocks have 28.3%
lower vulnerability (significant at the 5% level). These households also face less
poverty (significant at the 5% level), suggesting that such shocks reflect the deaths
of relatively unproductive household members. That is, while the death of a house-
hold member who provides a main source of income will increase the household’s
vulnerability, the death of an unproductive member of a household may reduce the
household’s vulnerability because he or she ceases to claim a share of household
resources (Van Cott 2000; Miguel 2005).
Table 4.4 shows that secondary education mitigates the effect of smoke ex-
posure on vulnerability in total consumption. In particular, smoke raises the vul-
nerability of households whose heads have tertiary education while it lowers the
vulnerability of households whose heads have secondary education (each significant
at the 10% level). Smoke does not differentially influence the vulnerability of house-
holds whose heads have primary education.
4.6.2 Vulnerability in Food Consumption
Table 4.5 presents the correlates of each element of vulnerability in food con-
sumption with the same set of household characteristics. Comparing the relation-
ship between smoke and both measures of vulnerability implies that households who
are unaffected by natural disasters are able to reduce their vulnerability in non-food
consumption only. The effects of exposure to smoke on almost all elements of vulner-
ability in food consumption are statistically zero, except for the negligible reduction
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in idiosyncratic risk by 0.145% (significant at the 1% level) for a 1-unit increase in
the TOMS Aerosol Index. This result implies that households who live in areas that
are affected by smoke are no more vulnerable or likely to face poverty, aggregate
risk, or idiosyncratic risk than others who live in areas unaffected by smoke.
Unlike total consumption, households with male heads have no statistically
different level of vulnerability in food consumption. Neither do married household
heads seem to be statistically different than single heads in terms of their effect on
vulnerability in food consumption. However, the effect of education on vulnerability
remains in food consumption: while households with heads who graduated from
primary schools are no more or less vulnerable than households with heads who
graduated from universities; households with heads who graduated from secondary
schools face 33.8% less vulnerability and 0.157% less aggregate risk (significant at
the 10% levels) than those with heads who graduated from universities.
In addition to total consumption, farm households face a 32.4% increase in
vulnerability in food consumption relative to non-farm households (significant at
the 1% level). Of this increase, 26.1% comes from poverty risk, 1.47% comes from
aggregate risk, and 6.37% comes from unexplained risk, with a negligible 0.16%
reduction in idiosyncratic risk (all significant at the 5% level or higher). This result
suggests that farm households are likely to have large investments in agricultural
activities and are thus more vulnerable in food consumption to risks that affect
crop output, including smoke from the 1997 forest fires. Unlike the analysis on total




This study contributes to our understanding of vulnerability by focusing on the
role that the 1997 forest fires in Indonesia played in households’ total consumption
and food consumption. Using the decomposition method pioneered by Ligon and
Schechter (2003), we find that households who live in areas unaffected by smoke
from the 1997 forest fires were less vulnerable in total consumption, but they were
no less vulnerable or likely to face poverty, aggregate risk, or idiosyncratic risk in
food consumption than those who live in areas that were affected by smoke.
The results of this study have important policy implications. First, in con-
trast to a number of studies showing that female-headed households are not more or
less vulnerable than male-headed households (e.g., Ligon and Schechter 2002), this
chapter finds that the presence of a male household head reduces the household’s
vulnerability in total consumption. Second, we find that non-farm households are
less vulnerable in both total and food consumption, suggesting that income diversifi-
cation is an important factor in consumption smoothing. Third, the study provides
ample evidence to support the value of education: not only do households with
more educated household heads face less vulnerability in both total and food con-
sumption, but those with heads who graduated from secondary schools have lower
vulnerability in both total consumption food consumption, producing the largest
percentage reductions in the vulnerability measures. Thus, promoting education
seems to be an effective policy to empower female-headed households with tools
to cope with risks. Given that only 25.1% of household heads in 1997 graduated
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from secondary school, policies to increase higher secondary school enrollment rates
would help to reduce vulnerability.
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Figure 4.1: Risk Aversion
and the expected utility of consumption.  This difference is represented by the 
distance between points A and B in Figure 1.  Consider two different scenarios.  
In the first scenario, each household faces two consumption periods.  There exists 
a probability p that the household obtains the consumption bundle c1 and a 
probability of )1( p− that it obtains the bundle c2 in both periods.  The household’s 
utility in this scenario can then be expressed as )(cEU , where  
 
€ 
U{c1,c2;p,(1− p)} = pU(c1)+ (1− p)U(c2)  
 























Refer to equation (1). The difference between the household’s utility of expected consumption and 
the expected utility of consumption is measured by the distance between A and B, which reflects 
the household’s risk.  If we consider z to be analogous to a poverty line, then the difference 
between the household’s utility of expected consumption and the utility of consumption bundle z 
that is measured by the distance between B and E reflects poverty.   
 
 
In the second scenario, each household receives the consumption bundle )(cE  
with certainty.  The utility of the second scenario can then be expressed simply as 
)(EcU .  A risk-averse household would prefer to have consumption bundle )(cE  
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4.3: Vulnerability in Total Consumption and Household Characteristics
VARIABLES Vulnerability (I)    Poverty (II) Aggregate Risk (III) Idiosyncratic Risk (IV) Unexplained Risk (V)
Age 0.00341 0.00309 0.0000770 0.0000162 0.00000428
(0.00358) (0.00400) (0.000205) (0.0000539) (0.00103)
Male -0.257* -0.213 -0.0150* 0.00333*** -0.0273
(0.143) (0.161) (0.00822) (0.00106) (0.0494)
Married 0.0819 0.187 0.0191** 0.000422 -0.121**
(0.160) (0.176) (0.00929) (0.00114) (0.0536)
PrimaryEd -0.114 -0.121 0.0112 -0.00103 0.00566
(0.135) (0.149) (0.00760) (0.00240) (0.0404)
SecondaryEd -0.515** -0.562** 0.0135 -0.00104 0.0440
(0.230) (0.222) (0.0118) (0.00184) (0.0661)
FarmHH 0.492*** 0.578*** -0.0112* -0.00137 -0.0660**
(0.112) (0.126) (0.00641) (0.00102) (0.0313)
Shock -0.283** -0.291** 0.00415 -0.00191* 0.0117
(0.119) (0.128) (0.00658) (0.00103) (0.0307)
Smoke 0.0360* 0.0737*** 0.00295 -0.00175*** 0.0237
(0.0182) (0.0325) (0.00383) (0.000556) (0.0183)
Observations 1143 1143 1143 1140 1140
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3 Vulnerability in Total Consumption and Household Characteristics
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Table 4.4: Vulnerability in Total Consumption and Household Characteristics (with in-
teractions)
VARIABLES Vulnerability (VI) Poverty (VII) Aggregate Risk (VIII) Idiosyncratic Risk (IX) Unexplained Risk (X)
Age 0.00303 0.00247 -0.0000339 -0.0000125 0.000572
(0.00428) (0.00480) (0.000246) (0.0000661) (0.00124)
Male -0.327** -0.283 -0.0155 0.00366*** -0.0323
(0.163) (0.186) (0.00962) (0.00126) (0.0589)
Married 0.0690 0.210 0.0202* 0.000633 -0.160**
(0.185) (0.205) (0.0109) (0.00137) (0.0636)
PrimaryEd 0.00730 0.00140 0.00540 -0.000765 0.00116
(0.163) (0.182) (0.00933) (0.00316) (0.0506)
SecondaryEd -0.261 -0.354 0.0211* -0.00377*** 0.0767
(0.267) (0.262) (0.0127) (0.00140) (0.0847)
FarmHH 0.453*** 0.584*** -0.0134* -0.00166 -0.115***
(0.135) (0.154) (0.00798) (0.00132) (0.0395)
Shock -0.253* -0.249 0.00193 -0.00213* -0.00533
(0.146) (0.156) (0.00805) (0.00129) (0.0379)
Smoke 0.0258* 0.0173* -0.0190 -0.00106 -0.0826
(0.0134) (0.008) (0.0155) (0.00227) (0.0736)
PrimaryEd X Smoke -0.286* -0.285* 0.0114 -0.000489 0.0133
(0.162) (0.173) (0.00865) (0.00191) (0.0412)
SecondaryEd X Smoke -0.588* -0.472 -0.0166 0.00560 -0.0872
(0.317) (0.291) (0.0199) (0.00357) (0.0691)
Observations 1143 1143 1143 1140 1140
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.5: Vulnerability in Food Consumption and Household Characteristics
VARIABLES Vulnerability (I) Povert (II) Aggregate Risk (III) Idiosyncratic Risk (IV) Unexplained Risk (V)
Age 0.000156 -0.000154 0.00000881 0.0000245 0.000256
(0.00273) (0.00233) (0.0000134) (0.0000341) (0.000776)
Male -0.122 -0.118 -0.000730 0.00139* -0.00409
(0.124) (0.107) (0.000551) (0.000714) (0.0311)
Married -0.0963 -0.0885 0.000141 0.000267 -0.00776
(0.140) (0.119) (0.000630) (0.000806) (0.0336)
PrimaryEd -0.111 -0.107 -0.000528 -0.000821 -0.00179
(0.101) (0.0840) (0.000500) (0.00177) (0.0357)
SecondaryEd -0.338* -0.231 -0.00157* -0.000217 -0.105**
(0.183) (0.147) (0.000900) (0.00148) (0.0426)
FarmHH 0.324*** 0.261*** 0.00147*** -0.00161** 0.0637**
(0.0896) (0.0762) (0.000404) (0.000725) (0.0282)
Shock -0.112 -0.105 -0.000688 -0.000002 -0.00558
(0.0945) (0.0790) (0.000447) (0.00105) (0.0286)
Smoke 0.0284 0.0201 0.0000376 -0.00145*** 0.00928
(0.0558) (0.0478) (0.000261) (0.000413) (0.0159)
Observations 567 567 567 566 566
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.6: Vulnerability in Food Consumption and Household Characteristics (with inter-
actions)
VARIABLES Vulnerability (VI) Poverty (VII) Aggregate Risk (VIII) Idiosyncratic Risk (IX) Unexplained Risk (X)
Age 0.00152 -0.00143 -0.00000185 0.0000239 -0.000116
(0.00346) (0.00291) (0.0000167) (0.0000464) (0.000894)
Male -0.0806 -0.0949 -0.000588 0.00182** 0.0131
(0.15) (0.129) (0.000656) (0.000894) (0.0370)
Married -0.145 -0.137 -0.0000354 -0.0000602 -0.00752
(0.172) (0.146) (0.000762) (0.00106) (0.0408)
PrimaryEd -0.0218 -0.0182 -0.0002 -0.000461 -0.00287
(0.132) (0.108) (0.000627) (0.00266) (0.0444)
SecondaryEd -0.161 -0.0953 -0.000764 -0.00158 -0.0637
(0.233) (0.189) (0.00103) (0.00145) (0.0541)
FarmHH 0.384*** 0.306*** 0.00172*** -0.00207** 0.0785**
(0.115) (0.0966) (0.000492) (0.00100) (0.0364)
Shock -0.108 -0.089 -0.000696 0.000566 -0.0188
(0.123) (0.100) (0.000566) (0.00148) (0.0364)
Smoke -0.0938 -0.0865 -0.000877 -0.00103 -0.00565
(0.225) (0.197) (0.00119) (0.00146) (0.0593)
PrimaryEd X Smoke -0.16 -0.154 -0.000617 -0.000605 -0.00399
(0.118) (0.101) (0.000621) (0.00154) (0.0417)
SecondaryEd X Smoke -0.307 -0.246 -0.00143 0.00228 -0.0623
(0.219) (0.181) (0.00129) (0.00213) (0.0485)
Observations 567 567 567 566 566
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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4.8 Appendix G
The second bracketed term in equation (4.3) that measures idiosyncratic risk
can be rewritten as:
EU i(E(cit|x̄t))− EU i(Ecit|x̄t, xit))
= [EU ii(E(cit|x̄t))− EU i(E(cit|x̄t, xi1t))]
+ [EU ii(E(cit|x̄t, xi1t))− EU i(E(cit|x̄t, xi1t, xi2t))]
...
+ [EU i(E(cit|x̄t, xi1t, ..., xi(k−1)t))− EU i(E(cit|x̄t, xi1t, ..., xikt))]
(4.5)
Suppose that xi1t represents the part of household’s farm labor income that
is orthogonal to household and time effects; that xi2t represents the part of current
household debt that is orthogonal to household effects, time effects, and household’s
farm labor income; and that xi3t represents the part of the household’s off-farm
income that is orthogonal to all the other variables. Then, the first bracketed term
gives a measure of the welfare loss that can be predicted using variation in household
i’s farm labor income, the second term measures the change in the prediction of
welfare loss after including data on current household debt, and the third term
measures the change after including data on household’s off-farm labor.
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